NA by Magee, Terry Edward
DIFFERENCES IN
AIRCRAFT ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT PRACTICES







AIRCRAFT ACQUISITION MANAGExMENT PRACTICES 1





Thesis Advisor: Commander A. Crosby, USN
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
T178641

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS ^ACE (Wh—t Oaia Snimrm^)
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE READ mSTRUCTIONSBEFORE COMPLETING FORM
t. REPORT NUMBER 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TyJLE (and Subtlllt)
Differences in Aircraft Acquisition
Management Practices between the
Air Force and the Navy
S. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED
Master's Thesis; Junel977
«. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AuTMORr*;
Terry Edward Magee
• . CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERf«J
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME ANO ADDRESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT. TASK
AREA ft WORK UNIT NUMBERS





13. NUMBER OF PAGES
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESSC" dUlutmnt Inm ControHIng OiUem)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
15. SECURITY CLASS, (ol thta riport)
Unclassified
15«. OECLASSIFIC ATI on/ DOWN GRADING
SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol thia Rmperl)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (et Ihu abatraet antarad In Block 30, II dlHarant /ran Raport)
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
19. KEY WORDS (Contlnua on tararaa aida II nacaaamrr and Idantlty by block numbar)
20. ABSTRACT (Conllnua on ravaraa alda II naeaaaary and Idantlty by block mmtbar)
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a comparative view
of aircraft procurement in the Air Force and the Navy. It is
not the intent of the author to evaluate concepts or procedures,
or to offer judgments on either service's efforts. It is instead
an attempt to delineate in detail where the services' approach
to a major aircraft procurement differ, problem areas encountered




AN 73 1473 EDITION OF I NOV SI IS OBSOLETE
S/N 0103-014- 4601
I
•tCURlTY CLASSIFICATION OF TMIl PAOC (Whan Data Knlarw^)

fuCUWITV CLASSIFICATION OF TMiS P»GEi"'»>«n n»tm Cntmr^d-
Structure, Project Manager responsibility, financial manage-
ment, documentation, information flow, personnel assignment,
functional responsibility and the operating environment.
The case study method is employed utilizing the Navy's
buy of the F-14 and the Air Force's buy of the F-15. The
similarities in time and purpose of these two major aircraft
procurements make them an excellent comparative situation.
This allows the author to cite specifics and use documented




S/N 0102-014-6601 $ECU«lTy CLASSIFICATION OF Tmi$ ^ACtf»*«" Dmtm Eni»t»4)

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
DIFFERENCES IN AIRCRAFT ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT
PRACTICES BETWEEN THE AIR FORCE AND THE NAVY
by
Terry Edward Magee
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.A., sue of New York at Brockport, 1969
Submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of









The purpose of this thesis is to provide a comparative
view of aircraft procurement in the Air Force and the Navy.
It is not the intent of the author to evaluate concepts or
procedures, or to offer judgments on either service's ef-
forts. It is instead an attempt to delineate in detail
where the services' approach to a major aircraft procure-
ment differ, problem areas encountered and avenues of
solutions pursued. Addressed will be organizational struc-
ture. Project Manager responsibility, financial management,
documentation, information flow, personnel assignment,
functional responsibility and the operating environment.
The case study method is employed utilizing the Navy's
buy of the F-14 and the Air Force's buy of the F-15. The
similarities in time and purpose of these two major aircraft
procurements make them an excellent comparative situation.
This allows the author to cite specifics and use documented






A. DOD AIRCRAFT ACQUISITION CYCLE 10
B. EVOLUTION OF PROGRAM MANAGER CONCEPT 16
C. CONDUCT OF THE AEROSPACE INDUSTRY AS
THE SELLER IN AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT 19
D. BACKGROUND DATA ON THE F-14 AND F-15 32
III. DIFFERENCES IN AIRCRAFT ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT 3 5
A. GUIDANCE THROUGH DOCUMENTATION AND
CHARTERING 3 5
B. CHAIN OF COMMAND/INFORMATION FLOW 4
C. PROGRAM OFFICE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 47
D. ASSIGNMENT, TRAINING, EXPERIENCE AND EDU- 52
CATION OF PROGRAM MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL 52
E. PMP - PREPARATION AND USE 59
F. DSARC - PREPARATION AND DCP CONSTRUCTION 62
G. TRAINING AND LOGISTICS 66
H. USER REPRESENTATION AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS 69
I. ON SITE DIRECT REPRESENTATION 71
J. GEOGRAPHICAL DISPERSION 72
K. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 74
L. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITY




V. PROBLEM AREAS AND AVENUES OF SOLUTION IN
THE F-14 AND F-15 PROGRAMS 82
VI. SUMMARY 92
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 94
APPENDIX A ACQUISITION DIRECTIVES 102
APPENDIX B F-14/PH0ENIX PROJECT OFFICE
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART 103
APPENDIX C F-14/PH0ENIX PROJECT MANAGEMENT OFFICE
PERSONNEL BREAKDOWN 104
APPENDIX D TYPICAL AIR FORCE PROGRAM OFFICE
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART 105
APPENDIX E F-15 SYSTEMS PROGRAM OFFICE
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART 10 6
APPENDIX F F-15 SYSTEM PROGRAM OFFICE
ORGANIZATIONAL BREAKDOWN 107
APPENDIX G F-15 SYSTEMS PROGRAM OFFICE
PERSONNEL BREAKDOWN 108
APPENDIX H F-15 SYSTEMS PROGRAM OFFICE
PERSONNEL EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND 109
APPENDIX I F-14/PH0ENIX PROJECT MANAGEMENT OFFICE





In today's society there is increased emphasis on reduc-
tion of waste in the government. With this prevailing atti-
tude a major aircraft acquisition draws considerable attention
and becomes a focal point and many times a target for exposure
of unfrugal practice in- the management of scarce resources.
This creates an environment of intense pressure, constant
high-level exposure and frustration for those tasked with
managing the acquisition, the Program Manager and his office.
In Fiscal Year 197 6 the total Department of Defense Military
Budget was $95,711,562,000. Eight percent of the budget or
$7,615,865,000 was appropriated for aircraft procurement. The
appropriation for Aircraft Procurement, Navy, was $3,354,465,000
or 3.5% of the total DoD Budget (Military). The appropriation
for Aircraft Procurement, Air Force, was $3,933,700,000 or 4%
of the total DoD Budget (Military) . Over 28% of its Aircraft
procurement appropriation was used by the Navy to purchase 74
F-14 aircraft. Over 25% of its Aircraft procurement appropria-
tion was used by the Air Force to purchase 105 F-15 aircraft.
In FY 76 approximately $2 Billion was dedicated to the purchase
of F-14 and F-15 aircraft for the Air Force and the Navy. For
Fiscal Year 1977 over 9.5 billion dollars will be appropriated
for aircraft procurement in the Department of Defense. Approxi-
mately 31% of this will be dedicated to the purchase of 108 F-15
aircraft and 72 F-14 aircraft.
The Budget of the U. S. Government. 197 8

The enormous amount of money appropriated for the procure-
ment of aircraft in DoD is broken down by program category
which corresponds to aircraft type. This is then entrusted to
the Program Manager and his office for management.
The Program Manager and those working for him have the awe-
some responsibility of managing the ultimate delivery of the
end product, the aircraft, in accordance with performance re-
quirements; within the limitations of their budget, and within
the time schedule specified. The Program Manager is thus a top-
level business executive tasked with planning, organizing, di-
recting and coordinating all program activity within his resource
limit and then evaluating performance for his acquisition. Ulti-
mately the Program Manager has to bear the responsibility for the
success or failure of his charged Aircraft Acquisition.
The differences in organizational structure, functional
responsibility and managerial techniques between the Air Force
and the Navy in the management of Aircraft Acquisitions will be
the primary topic of this thesis. The Acquisition of the F-14
by the Navy and the F-15 by the Air Force will be used as case
studies to identify the differences by example. Problem areas
encountered and methods utilized to solve these problems will
also be addressed with regard to the acquisitions of the F-14
and F-15.
The objective of the thesis is to provide a detailed descrip-
tion of the differences in Aircraft Acquisition Management be-
tween the United States Navy and the United States Air Force.
8

These service sisters, although autonomous units, are still
members of the parent organization, the Department of Defense.
As such, their programs should be oriented to achieving the
organizational objective. National Defense. Attainment of
this ambiguous output measurement is governed by general organ-
izational guidelines from the Department of Defense but speci-
fics in Aircraft Acquisition are discretionary procedures applied
by the individual services and guided by their strategies.
II. BACKGROUND
The object of this chapter is to provide the reader with
sufficient background material to enhance his ability to un-
derstand the differences in the Acquisition Management process
between the Air Force and the Navy in Aircraft Procurement.
Armed with background data the reader should be able to fit the
differences into context, understand the rationale behind the
differences and comprehend the impact these different manage-
ment approaches have on the total Acquisition Process. Dis-
cussed in this chapter will be a typical Aircraft Acquisition
Cycle in the Department of Defense, the evolution of the basic
management concept used in DoD Aircraft Procurement today, the
aerospace industry's conduct as the seller in the procurement
process and finally some basic data on the F-14 and F-15 air-
craft that is needed if the analytical case study mode is to
be used.

A. TYPICAL DOD AIRCRAFT ACQUISITION CYCLE
To comprehend the complicated world of aircraft procure-
ment and the intricacies of Program Management one must be
familiar with the typical cycle that is evident in most De-
partment of Defense major Aircraft Acquisitions. This cycle
applies regardless of the service designated as sponsor and
tasked with the Acquisition Management. Initially it is help-
ful to identify the distinct difference between buying major
systems in the Defense Department and buying major systems in
the commercial sector. Buyers and sellers of commercial systems,
specifically aircraft, do not usually arrive at a purchase and
sales agreement until at least one aircraft of the proposed
type has been developed and tested for effectiveness. Buyers
and sellers of military aircraft, however, agree upon a firm
estimate of cost and fee before the product even exists. Usu-
ally the Department of Defense funds the research, design and
development. As the Aircraft progresses through its life cycle,
the concomitant management process involves trade-off decisions
regarding schedules, costs and technical performance. Thus the
basic economic concept of supply and demand which determines
market prices in the commercial sector is removed in defense
procurement. The Defense Department being a non-profit organi-
zation with a demand that must be filled to meet national defense
objectives immediately finds itself in a unique position when
dealing with the Aerospace Industry.
The acquisition of an aircraft is generally a two-stage
process. The first stage includes planning, research,
10

development, testing and evaluation. The second stage is
production. To understand the stages and the sequence of
events that takes place in each stage, a Life Cycle Manage-
ment Model built around a time line is of great help. (See
Figure 1.) Steps 1 through 6 make up Stage 1, while steps
7 through 9 make up Stage 2. To elaborate on and explain
some of the steps involved, a brief description follows.
Initially in Step 1 the Department of Defense identifies
a security threat, from which a mission need is defined. Ser-
vice proposals to initiate a major weapons system project to
fill the need are advanced. With a favorable top-level deci-
sion at Milestone (Step 3) , a project is initiated to iden-
tify alternative ways to fulfill the mission. This will
involve the individual military service selected most suitable
to perform the mission, interested aerospace contractors, and
contracted consulting firms in a coordinated effort conducted
with funds provided by Congress in the form of RDT&E (Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation) appropriations. Out of this
effort comes a program concept with a proposed tedhnically-
feasible approach (e.g. an aircraft) . At the end of this pro-
cess, which occurs late in Step 4, DSARC I occurs. This is an
extensive review of the Program to date by a Defense System
Acquisition Review Council. There are three DSARC ' s in any
Acquisition Cycle. They are extensive and detailed reviews
of the program to date by Assistant Secretaries from the Office
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Program for effectiveness, cost, integration into the pro-
jected national defense picture and feasiblity of continuing.
The DSARC then makes its recommendations regarding the program
to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) . The DEPSECDEF
makes the key system decision (proceed, modify or cancel) based
mainly on the DSARC ' s recommendation. One can see that effec-
tive, impressive and knowledgeable presentations to the DSARC
are essential to the Program's existence. All three DSARC '
s
are equally critical, and a decision to proceed is required
before the Acquisition Cycle advances to the next step. (Pre-
paration for a DSARC will be addressed in a subsequent chapter.)
If DSARC I results in the decision to proceed, the Cycle pro-
gresses to Step 5, which is the validation phase. During
Validation refined design development on the aircraft is con-
ducted. Extensive testing is undergone all with the intent of
achieving validation at DSARC II. This is a crucial step for
if validation is achieved through DSARC II, funds are then usu-
ally committed to development of an aircraft buy. This lot
buy is very small and usually involves the prototype aircraft
for testing. If validation is achieved through DSARC II, the
Acquisition Cycle advances to Step 6. This is full-scale deve-
lopment and involves three very important processes in the Ac-
quisition Cycle. The first of these is development of a proto-
type, which either confirms or disavows that the aircraft can
achieve in the air capabilities designed by the use of models.
Engineering development is conducted on the prototype. This
IS

involves extensive prototype testing and the elimination of
discrepancies which eventually leads to parameters for pro-
duction. The second of the important processes is contract
definition. This is the evolution by which a contractor is
selected and a contract awarded. The contract definition
process is extremely important and for an adequate background
in aircraft procurement deserves a more detailed description.
Contract Definition is divided into three phases. The
first is Request for Proposal (RFP) . This is a detailed do-
cument sent out by the Department of Defense to all contrac-
tors that are interested, and more importantly, determined
capable by DoD through the service sponsor of producing the
desired aircraft. The RFP is an extensive and technically-
oriented document containing all the parameters required for
the aircraft and its system. The second phase in Contract
Definition is the awarding of contracts, under which each
interested contractor prepares proposals for the engineering
development effort. These proposals are then submitted to DoD
through the service sponsor for consideration. The third and
final phase in Contract Definition is that of source selection.
The proposals submitted by the contractors are evaluated. This
is an extremely complex and time-consuming process. The intense
competition between Aerospace Industry firms for Defense busi-
ness dictates that the contractor's proposals be very detailed
and inclusive in an attempt to win the contract. The proposals
for an aircraft usually run into thousands of pages and are
14

examined by a formal source selection process headed by a
Source Selection Authority. This is usually the Secretary
of Defense or his Deputy. Working for him will be a Source
Selection Advisory Council, which establishes criteria and
assigns weighting to various aspects of the aircraft (speed,
cost, firepower, etc.) and contractor capability. A Source
Selection Evaluation Board also works for the Source Selection
Authority on the selection process. Its function is to do the
in-depth analysis of the submitted proposals. The Source Se-
lection Evaluation Board's analysis, conclusions and recom-
mendations are forwarded to the Council, which weights various
areas and summarizes data. It includes its own conclusion and
recommendations and this is then sent to the Source Selection
Authority. The Source Selection Authority takes the analysis
and recommendations made by his Council and Board on all the
contractors' proposals, evaluates them, confers with those
negotiating contract specifics with prospective contractors
and finally makes his selection. This process can take any-
where from four to nine months. Concurrently with the selec-
tion process, negotiations with contractors who submitted
proposals are conducted on contract specifics. At this point
the third important process in this step takes place. This is
DSARC III. The decision in DSARC III is whether, based on pro-
gram progress to datQ production should be entered into. If the
decision is to proceed into production, the negotiated contract
is signed and the contract is awarded. With the awarding of a
contract we complete gtage I of the Acquisition Cycle.
15

stage II begins with the contractor producing the desired
aircraft according to a negotiated schedule. The production
aircraft are then tested, evaluated, and if need be, retrofitted
to meet required standards and finally they are delivered for
deployment and operational use. Contracted support for the air-
craft is supplied by the contractor throughout the operational
life of the aircraft. This completes a typical Aircraft Ac-
quisition Cycle in the Department of Defense. Time involved
in the cycle is deteirmined by the complexity of the aircraft
and the size of the buy. The F-14 Acquisition Cycle will span
a 13-year period and the F-15 Acquisition Cycle is proposed to
be in excess of 14 years.
B. EVOLUTION OF PROGRAM MANAGER CONCEPT IN AIRCRAFT
PROCUREMENT
In the Aircraft Acquisition Cycle the need for a Program
Manager is identified at Step 3, Milestone 0, in the diagrammed
life cycle model (Figure 1) . Shortly thereafter the Project
Manager is selected, assigned, his office created and staffed
and responsibility for the Aircraft Acquisition Management
delegated. It is then the Program Manager takes control and
acts as a conductor trying to guide the process through the
major part of the Acquisition Cycle. The Program Manager tries
to develop and tailor an acquisition strategy for the balance
of the program and to make trade-off decisions in aircraft
capability, cost, schedule and risk within stated ranges
based upon the basic strategy.
16

A brief history of how the present method of managing not
only Aircraft Acquisitions but all Major Weapon System Acqui-
sitions in DoD evolved will be beneficial as a starting point
in understanding the differences exhibited between the Navy
and the Air Force in their management of Aircraft Acquisitions
Prior to the mid-1950 's, military procurement, and more
specifically. Major Weapon System Acquisition was done by a
task-orented management organization which was a service mix-
ture and worked on several weapon system acquisitions simul-
taneously. This was found to be inefficient and lacking in
control, especially of spending. These groups were found to
be handling too many projects and were not exercising proper
control in the acquisition process due to lack of familiarity
and involvement. These supposed task-oriented management
groups were acting more as reviewers instead of directors
and controllers in the process. Consequently, as an attempt
to centralize and strengthen the management and allocation of
resources for programs most critical to the nation's defense
posture or most costly to the Department of Defense, Project
Management Offices were conceptualized and introduced. Under
this system, the Project Management Office, under a Project
Manager, deals exclusively with one specific Weapon System
Acquisition and manages that Weapon System Acquisition Cycle




Under the Project Manager concept of Major Weapon System
Acquisition Management have evolved three distinct organiza-
tional structures. The first is a functional organization ••;
where the Project Manager alone tries to coordinate and direct
the activities of already established staffs and specialists
in other organizations which are put at his disposal. The
second type is a project organization where the Project Manager
has a permanently assigned staff to accomplish all needed ob-
jectives. This staff is typically divided into Divisions with
each Division being responsible for a certain area of the Ac-
quisition process and in reality is a self-contained Systems Pro-
gram Office within a Systems Program Office. The size of the
staff varies depending upon the level of technology, cost and
intricacy of the Weapon System being procured, but will gener-
ally range from 150-300 people. The third type of organization
has been termed Matrix. This type of organization will have a
small staff of personnel permanently assigned and who are dele-
gated responsibility for specific areas of the acquisition.
They then will draw upon existing staffs and specialists in
other organizations as the need arises.
The Navy utilizes the Matrix organization in its Project
Management Offices for the Acquisition of Aircraft. The Air
Force on the other hand employs the project organization struc-
ture in its Program Management offices in Aircraft Acquisition.
The reasoning behind the selection of these two approaches
will be discussed at length later in the paper.
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C. CONDUCT OF THE AEROSPACE INDUSTRY AS THE SELLER IN
AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT
There are two principals in any aircraft procurement: the
buyer, a DoD Service Unit, and the seller, a company of the
Aerospace Industry. To understand the environment in which a
Project Manager operates and its effect on the management pro-
cess of an aircraft acquisition, a basic understanding of the
Aerospace Industry, its approach to the acquisition process
and its attitude is necessary.
Presently the Aerospace Industry is one of the ten major
2industries in this country. This ranking is based on a com-
bination of sales, net worth, assets, employment and, inter-
estingly enough, not on profitability.
For the 10-year period from Fiscal Year 1966-Fiscal Year
197 6, approximately 17 of the top 20 DoD companies were Aero-
space Industry companies. For the same period, 41 out of the
top 100 DoD companies were from the Aerospace Industry. Ap-
proximately 58 percent of the net value of military prime
contracts awarded to the top DoD companies were awarded to
the 41 Aerospace companies for this period. The industry sup-
plies 58 percent of the Navy's contractual business and almost
70% of the Air Force's. It is interesting to note that most
of the contracts awarded to other than Aerospace Industries
are basically presupposed upon the aircraft industry producing
an effective weapon system in the support of the other contracts
^ Moody's Industrial Manual - 1977.
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DoD has been and will continue to be heavily dependent on
the aircraft industry to develop and fulfill its hardware
3
and technological needs.
To relate to the specific cases that will be used in this
thesis in Fiscal Year 1976, McDonnell Douglas Corporation/ the
prime contractor for the Air Force's F-15 received 5.87 percent
of the money dedicated in the Department of Defense Budget for
military prime contracts of $10,000 or more. This amounted
to approximately $2,4 64,563/000. The greatest percentage of
this was for the procurement of 105 F-15 aircraft. For the
same period, Grumman Corporation, the prime contractor for the
Navy's F-14, received 2.34 percent of the money dedicated in the
Department of Defense Budget for military prime contracts of
.
$10,000 or more. This amounted to $982,026,000 of which a large
4percentage was for the procurement of 74 F-14 aircraft.
The history of the Aerospace Industry is very cyclical in
nature and illustrates the government's paternalistic feelings
towards the industry. In 1909 the Army purchased an airplane
from the Wright Brothers for evaluation of its possible mil-
itary worth. This coupled with the American entry into World
War I prompted the Army to ask for a large buildup in the Avi-
ation area. Congress responded by voting 640 million dollars for
3 Standard and Poor's "Aerospace Current Analyses," November
27, 1976.
4
"Top 100 Defense Department Contractors," Aviation Week
and Space Technology , 14 March 1977, p. 51.
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military aviation in 1917. This available money attracted many
entrepreneurial companies into the aircraft building business.
These companies were mainly off-shoots of the auto industry
where resources and production lines already existed. With
the coming of the Armistice, the industry was thrown into
utter chaos. The military had no foreseeable need for aircraft
and they consequently cancelled contracts and sold surplus air-
craft. Many of the aircraft production companies went out of
business and the only thing that saved the major companies in
the industry was Government intervention with subsidization
and legislation in the form of the Kelly Act of 1925 and the
National Air Law of 1926. Thus the first cycle is complete and
the paternalistic attitude of the government has been fostered.
The Industry was rejuvenated by Lindbergh's epic flight
in 1927. This kindled the flame of transportation by air and
created a demand for commercial aircraft. Most of the major
aerospace companies as we know them today were born at this
time. Also the Aerospace Industry underwent a major trans-
formation into a big business industry with mergers taking
place and the evolution of holding companies, investment trusts,
consolidated manufacturing companies and big corporations. Con-
gress sensed the Aerospace Industry's impact on the future and
continued to pass favorable legislation to help the industry
expand and grow.




The Depression of the 30' s was very harsh on the Aerospace
Industry. Many of the smaller new entrants were forced out of
business and the only thing that kept the industry from total
collapse was government intervention in the foinn of five-year
programs for production of military aircraft. This completed
another cycle in the industry's volatile history.
World War II brought another boom to the industry and its
growth and expansion was phenomenal. Aircraft production
plants sprang up all over the country centering mainly in po-
pulous areas for labor sources. The end of World War II again
brought disaster to the industry by 1946. Production had ceased
in all but sixteen of the sixty-six airframe plants in operation
in January 1944. Again Congressional intervention and subsidy
prevented the collapse of the industry. The Korean War brought
a sudden need for the Industry's products and it again grew and
flourished. This time the Aerospace Industry displayed foresight
however. Instead of relying on the present, they took the money
they were making from present sales and reinvested it in R&D
and began to look to the future markets as they realized the
end of the war could bring collapse. Expansion into missile
production, commercial jet transports and exploratory
research on space travel allowed the industry to weather the
storm almost totally on its own when the Korean Conflict ended.
Simonson, G. (ed.) , JThe History of the American Aircraft
Industry, (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press), 1968.
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The commercial jet market, continued military production in
both missiles and aircraft and the space program supported
the industry until the late 1960 's and early 1970 's. At this
time missile production was reduced, the space program had
slipped from the limelight and the commercial transport market
had been totally exploited except for the jumbo jets which
were questionable. Again the saving grace was government in-
tervention. The Department of Defense realized that conventional
warfare was not a thing of the past, but of the present and the
future. Limiting treaties, a nuclear stand-off and struggles
in evolving nations such as Viet Nam demonstrated that for world
defense the United States must maintain a superiority in conven-
tional warfare and this meant air superiority and close air sup-
port. This brought a resurgence of development of military
aircraft to fulfill these mission needs and the industry ex-
ploited this field and is its basic area of endeavor today.
Will the industry see another typical cycle of boom then
chaos or is it finally inundated with stability. History will
answer that question, but one thing is certain. The government
has demonstrated that it considers the industry essential for
National Defense and will ensure its existence.
The interdependency of the Aerospace Industry on Defense
business and the Department of Defense on industry products
has been demonstrated. The paternalistic approach of the
government towards the industry has been exhibited. How
23

does this impact the relationship between the Department of
Defense and the Aerospace Industry and help shape the conduct
of the Aerospace Industry?
The conduct of the Aerospace Industry in dealing with the
Department of Defense refers to the patterns of behavior that
various companies follow in adapting or adjusting to the De-
fense Industry market. The importance of structure lies in the
way it induces firms to behave. This behavior links the indus-
7try's structure to the quality of its performance. One can
examine the conduct of the industry through the major sub-
elements of conduct that are at work in the operating environ-
ment and readily see the impact they can have on the manage-
ment process of the manager of an Aircraft Procurement. These
sub-elements are product strategy, pricing behavior, DoD con-
tracting, research and development and competition.
Product strategy . In the Aerospace Industry in 197 6 pro-
duct lines consisted of government aircraft (26 percent); com-
mercial and private aircraft and equipment (30 percent); mis-
siles, space vehicles, and related hardware (29 percent) ; and
15 percent for non-aerospace products and services. This su-
perficially may seem inconsistent with the dependency of the
Industry on DoD business, but if one adds to this the fact
that government aircraft made up the largest part of the aero-
space sales amounting to S16.8 billion, the dependency is
7
Caves, Richard, American Industry: Structure, Conduct
,




extremely evident. The products that the industry sells the
Department of Defense are of high-value, low-volume items of a
technologically complex nature requiring high funding levels and
providing the industry with income in many instances for more
than ten years from concept to completion. Thus a fair share
of the Defense business is a must if a company is to maintain
its ranking and position and prosper accordingly. The Aero-
space Industry recognizes this need and consequently attacks
the Defense market, which ultimately means attacking the Ac-
quisition Managers, if contract definition has not yet been
completed.
Pricing Behavior . The heavy dependence on the Department
of Defense for high unit value products lines and the visibility
this brings fortunately helps restrict the industry in altering
pricing behavior in periods of rapidly changing costs. In this
environment cost changes are more penetrating and direct, and
the impact is heavier on the single customer, negating indis-
. . . . . 9
criminating pricing. This is a benefit to someone managing
the acquisition of an aircraft from the Department of Defense
viewpoint, but the industry has been able to circumvent this
through contracting and playing on the government's paternal-
istic instincts as we will see.
Aerospace Industries Association, Aerospace Facts and
Figures, 1975/1976. (New York: McGraw-Hill) , 1976
Aerospace Industries Association, Aerospace and the
U.S. Economy (Washington, D.C.: Aerospace Industries
Association) , November l971.
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Department of Defense -Contracting with the Aircraft Industry .
Major cost overruns on Aircraft procurement have created an ex-
tensive search by DoD to find a contracting method to, in some
way/ stem the floodwaters. Presently in Stage I of the Acquisi-
tion Cycle in Aircraft Procurement a cost-plus fee type con-
tract is used to give recognition to the uncertainty involved.
Simply translated, this contract provides the Aerospace con-
tractor with reimbursement of costs incurred plus a negotiable
fee. This can be exploited by the Industry, as we will examine
in the next sub-element and can create significant problems for
the Aircraft Acquisition Manager who is trying to maintain some
degree of controllability over incurred costs.
In Stage II of the Cycle, the Production Phase, the Depart-
ment of Defense has employed a fixed-price incentive contract
to try and control costs. The parameters usually utilized in
aircraft procurement for incentives are: target cost, range
of incentive effectiveness, sharing ratio and target profit.
The theory behind the utilization of these fixed-price incen-
tive contracts is that the Aerospace contractor will be influ-
enced to effectively control costs and to make cost-associated
trade-off decisions in a way favorable to the government. The
concept of the sharing ratio employed in these type contracts
illustrates this. The sharing ratio is based on a percentage
of a dollar and will state that the contractor's profit will
increase the agreed-upon percentage of a dollar for every dol-
lar he saves in cost under the fixed price. Conversely, however
26

if costs exceed the fixed price the contractor does not bear
the entire burden of the overruns. A sharing ratio is utilized
which will usually state that the contractor will bear a cer-
tain percentage of every dollar in overruns and the government
will absorb the remainder.
Also the concept of a ceiling price is utilized in the fixed
price incentive, contracts as an insurance against massive cost
overrun. This ceiling price figure tells the contractor the
maximum the government will pay, cost and profit for the com-
pletion of the contract no matter what the cost outcome. To
try and compensate for the fluctuating and unpredictable eco-
nomy, escalation clauses are also written into these fixed-
price incentive contracts. Escalation is the explicit con-
tractual treatment of price change in which the contract price
is adjusted after price changes are measured. Thus input price
uncertainty is removed or reduced. Theoretically, the above-
mentioned provisions in contracting should enhance the Acquisi-
tion Manager's position and provide accountability and control-
lability. Realistically, this is not the case. The Aerospace
Industry finds security in the belief that the government will
bail them out because their products are a necessity and even
more basic, their existence is a necessity to National Defense.
Although they attempt to abide by contract specifics, if diffi-
culties are experienced, especially in remaining within the
ceiling price, they are almost assured of being reimbursed and
Sovereign, Michael G., and Carl R. Jones, "Escalation
Provisions for Navy Contracts, Issues and Choices,"
May 1975.

production continuing for the entire procurement lot. This
will be vividly illustrated when discussing the F-14 and the
Grumman Company's inability to live within the constraints of
its contract due to financial problems in the middle of the
production cycle. It is readily evident that the Acquisition
Manager can have a relatively weak bargaining position. If the
Aerospace Company does not meet its contractual commitment, the
Project manager is virtually powerless to penalize the contrac-
tor and in the long run an essential aircraft will continue to
be produced by that same contractor [It is totally uneconomi-
cal to contract with another producer due to mammoth start-up
costs and problems of transfer of developed technology.] who
ultimately will benefit from the contract.
Research and Development . Research and Development is the
life-line of the Aerospace Industry. They must be constantly
analyzing future needs, channeling technology and developing
products to meet demands. As one reviews the history of avia-
tion, it is easy to see that military aircraft have often paved
the way for advances in commercial aviation and one can easily
detect a continual cross-feed of technology between the military
and applicable commercial sectors.
Competition . Competition between firms in the Aerospace
Industry for Defense business is extremely intense. The main
purchasers of the Industry's products are the military services.
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Although all the services are branches of the Department of
Defense, to some extent they compete with each other for
military missions, for public funds, and generally deal inde-
pendently with Aerospace Companies in the procurement of the
Industry's products. The Aerospace Production Firms compete
by offering superior technical expertise and prompt delivery
of their products at a realistic price, because these are the
factors emphasized by their military customers. The Industry's
basic competence is invention, discovery, and the organization
and coordination of the efforts of huge teams of scientists
and engineers. The contract definition phase in the Aircraft
Acquisition Cycle has been previously discussed. It is an im-
portant phase not only to the service involved, but also to the
competing contractors. The competing contractors perform de-
sign engineering far beyond what was intended in order to en-
hance the probability that they will win the full-scale develop-
ment contracts. As a result their proposals are staggering
volumes involving large sums of government money and valuable
personnel time in the Source Selection Process. Due to the
ferocity of the competition in the Industry, attempts by DoD
to hold down the magnitude of the documents have been unsuc-
cessful mainly because the bidders hope to win by outclassing
12their rivals in design refinement.
Jacoby, Neil H., Corporate Power and Social Rp f^pnn.si hi 1 ity
(New York: MacMillan, Inc.), 1973.
12 Adams, Walter, The Structure of American Industry, 4th ed.




One of the biggest headaches in aircraft procurement is
the conduct exhibited by the Aerospace Industry caused by
competition when the Aerospace Companies utilize a concept
known as "buying-in." The government's budgets are published
well in advance, so Industry contractors know how many dol-
lars are anticipated as being available for both stages of
the Acquisition Cycle. Thus, there is no real price competition,
but there is a significant tendency for the contractor to make
an unrealistically low bid when the terms of the contract will
obligate the government to pay for those costs that exceed the
contract price. This is known as "buying-in." [It is espec-
ially evident in Stage I of the Acquisition Cycle.] Naturally,
the firm which presents the most promising approach is awarded
the contract through Source Selection Evaluation and the con-
tracted aerospace firm is aware before it begins that its pro-
posal is optimistic but it is also aware that it can depend on
the government to reimburse it on cost overruns. The Acquisition
Manager is already in an untenable position and must realisti-
cally begin with overruns that are guaranteed and uncontrollable
if "buy-in" has been employed. We see the "buy-in" concept at
work in both the F-14 and F-15 procurements.
In conclusion the Aerospace Industry is profit-motivated
and seeks to maximize its return in a free enterprise environ-
ment. The Acquisition Manager needs to be aware of this and
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also of the paternalistic attitude towards the industry by
the government when he shapes his acquisition strategy and
strives for controllability.
One approach by the Aerospace Industry to Defense Busi-
ness is summed up by Robert S. Tucker, formerly an official
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and now an Aero-
space Industry Manager, when he said:
"A Company which does a thorough and factual job
of analysing and pricing the risks attending its
proposed approach to system development will more
likely than not find itself the loser to a more
optimistic competitor. With too little business to
go around, survival is inevitably more compelling
13than objectivity."
13
Fox, R. J. Arming: America , Boston Division of
Research, Harvard University, 1974.
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D. BACKGROUND DATA ON THE F-14 AND F-15
A brief background of the F-14 and the F-15 and data on
development of the two aircraft will be informative and facilitate
understanding when discussing the two procurements in the case
study mode.
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20 mm multi-barrel cannon
(675 rounds of ammo)
6 AIM - 54A Phoenix Missiles
6 AIM - 7E/F SparrowMissiles
4 AIM - 9 6L Sidewinder
Missiles
Crew ; Two -
A pilot and in the rear seat
a Radar Intercept Officer who
controls the detection and
engagement aspects of the
Weapon System.
Engines ;




Pulse Doppler Radar Weapons
System.






20 mm multi-barrel cannon
(960 rounds of ammo)
4 AIM - 9L Sidewinders
4 AIM - 7F Sparrow (Air-to-Air
Missiles)
Provisions for carrying up to
12,000 lbs of ordnance on
three weapon stations.
Crew; One -
Pilot controls both airplane
and entire weapons system.
First Flight; 21 December 1970. First Flight; 27 July 1972.




Projected Total Procurement ;
Presently 334 aircraft
Hope to gain an increase to
390 aircraft.
Deployed for Operational Use




Hope to gain an increase to
749 aircraft.
Total Aircraft Delivered;
As of 30 June 1976 = 258
Total Aircraft Delivered






Total Program Cost ;
(Projected in Program Base
Year Dollars - 1968)
$8,676,100,000
PROGRAM UNIT COST (PUC)
PUC :
(This is based on dollar
values of the years cited)
Initially = 8.7 million
June 1970 = 12.63 million
June 1971 = 13.146 million
April 1974 = 18. million
Presently and projected to





Total Program Cost :
(Projected in Program Base
Year Dollars - 1968)
$12,171,100,000
= TOTAL PROGRAM COST
Total # of Aircraft to be
Procured
PUC:
(This is based on dollar
values of the years cited)
Initially = 7.1 million
June 1970 = 8.4 million
June 1971 = 9.8 million
1974 = 14.04 million
Presently and projected to
completion - 16+ million
At program conception DoD was envisioning the "high-low"
concept in its next two Fighter Aircraft Procurements for the
Navy and the Air Force. The Navy's F-14 and the Air Force's
F-15 would be used for "high-threat areas" with a follow-on
now the F-16 for the Air Force and the F-18 for the Navy to
be a low cost "low-threat area" fighter.




III. DIFFERENCES IN AIRCRAFT ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT
A. GUIDANCE THROUGH DOCUMENTATION AND CHARTERING
The Acquisition Cycle of an. Aircraft is primarily controlled
by four Department of Defense Documents, as follows:
Department of Defense Directive 5000.1 - Major System Acquisi-
tions which defines that major "systems" are those that:
(1) have an estimated RDT&E cost in excess of 75 million
dollars or an estimated production cost in excess of 300
million dollars; (2) are of national urgency; and (3) are
recommended to be treated as major by a DoD Component Head
or OSD official. It also delineates Milestones - III
that occur in the Acquisition Process and establishes
guidelines for the assignment of a Program Manager, creation
of his office and the authority and responsibility this Pro-
gram Manager has.
Department of Defense Directive 5000.2 - Major System Acquisition
Process which provides policies and procedures essential to
DoD activities in support of the Secretary of Defense decision-
making process for major system acquisitions. It also estab-
lished the DSARC as the review group for "major systems" for
the SECDEF and dictated that the DCP (Decision Coordinating
Paper) would be the supporting document for review of major
systems by the SECDEF.
Department of Defense Directive 5000.3 - Test and Evaluation
which established the responsibilities of the Deputy Direc-
tor, Defense Research and Engineering, Test and Evaluation
35

and the requirement for independent test and evaluation of
defense systems.
Department of Defense Directive 5000.4 - OSD Cost Analysis Im-
provement Group which established the CAIG and the require-
ment for an Independent Parametric Cost Estimate for all
major programs.
These four primary DoD documents are supported by a number
of related policy documents dealing with specific functional
areas in Systems Acquisitions. A list of these documents is
contained in Appendix A. Of course the individual services
have taken the general guidelines in these documents and have
expounded on them in great detail with specifics to cover their
unique needs. The two major documents in this area are the
Navy Instruction 5000.1 and the Air Force Regulation 8 00-2 is-
sued by the respective Secretaries. From this has erupted a
snowball effect with every command in both services involved in
any way with Aircraft Acquisition issuing their own specific di-
rective, instruction or notice. Coupled with this are various
acquisition management guides that have been created to aid the
Program Manager in his acquisition process. If one were to as-
similate all the Directives, Instructions, Notices and Guides
applicable in any way to Aircraft Acquisitions, one would be
affected by a package of rules that encompass almost five hun-
dred separate directives. Suffice to say that there is enough
guidance available to aid in Aircraft Acquisition, but the point
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the author would like to make about this documentation is that
no matter how specific it is proposed to be, it still deals in
generalities for the Program Manager and leaves a majority of the
Acquisition Process resting on his good judgment, the expertise
available and the management policies he employs. I feel that
this is best summed up by a statement out of the primary control-
ling document, DoD D 5000.1. "Responsibility for the management
of system acquisition programs shall be decentralized to the DoD
Components except for the decisions retained by the Secretary of
Defense." This decentralization permeates down till it finally
comes to rest with the Program Manager. It would be impossible
and detrimental to try to provide specifics for every contin-
gency that arises due to the uncertainties involved in Aircraft
Acquisition. Flexibility in methods of control, documentation
and decision criteria as an Aircraft Acquisition progresses
through its life cycle is essential, especially as we move for-
ward in history and the environment continually changes.
-
The Department of Defense Directive 5000.1 states that when
the Secretary of Defense approves program initiation at Milestone
0, the DoD component shall assign the program manager for major
system acquisition. In the diagrammed cycle model depicted ear-
lier. Milestone corresponds to Step Three. Thus at Step Three
the Program Manger is selected, assigned, his office created and
he is given the task of the Aircraft Acquisition Management.
In the Navy the assignment of the Program Manager and the
creation of his office is done via a charter. The charter is
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an official document which creates the need for a Program
Manager and his office, assigns the Program Manager, estab-
lishes his office and staff, describes his responsibilities,
provides sufficient authority to accomplish stated program
directives, defines the chain of command, and provides general
guidelines. Chartering is a concept employed because it was
felt that historically the Program Manager was not being given
adequate authority to accomplish program objectives and that
Program Managers did not really understand their position or
responsibilities in the acquisition process. Chartering was
initiated to rectify these deficiencies. The Chief of Naval
Material (CNM) , under the CNO, is assigned the responsibility
for major system acquisitions in the Navy. The CNM is the
individual charged with chartering authority. In the case of
aircraft acquisitions he delegates his chartering authority
to the Commander Naval Air Systems Command (COMNAVAIRSYSCOM)
.
The Commander Naval Air Systems Command is the individual
charged with coordinating, monitoring and providing liaison
for all Navy Aircraft Acquisitions, aeronautical system ac-
quisition and air-launched missiles acquisitions. To cite
our specific example, the Commander Naval Air Systems Command
issued a charter in June of 1968 which assigned the F-14/
Phoenix Project Manager and established the F-14/Phoenix Pro-
ject management Office. It was given the identifying number of
PMA-241.[All Project Managers for Major System Acquisitions in
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the Navy are given an identifying number which, originated as
a sequential process from the initiation of the Program Mana-
ger concept, PMA" identifies the office of Project Management
Air vice PMS which is Project Management Ship,]
The Air Force differs slightly in the establishment of its
Program Office. Chartering is utilized, but in a much more gen-
eralized manner. The charter just establishes the need for a
Program Manager and the creation of his management office and dic-
tates that it be done. The actual specifics are given through
a directive. This directive is called a Program Management
Directive (PMD) and is issued by the Commander Air Force Systems
Command. This PMD is an offshoot of the Decision Coordinating
Paper utilized for DSARC I and specifies assignment of the Pro-
gram Manager, creation of the Systems Program Office, staffing,
responsibility and authority. The Commander Air Force Systems
Command is comparable in responsibility and tasking to the
Navy's Chief of Naval Material in major system acquisitions.
To cite our specific example, the charter for the F-15 program
VQs issued, in early 1969, by Deputy Secretary of Defense David
Packard. The specifics followed within a month and were contained
in a PMD embodied in AFSC Form 56 which was an offshoot of CDP
19 in the F-15 program. This established the F-15 Systems Pro-
gram Office with the program office identifier of YF. [All pro-
gram management offices in the Air Force are coded with a
letter code. Y simply identifies it as being part of the
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Aeronautical Systems Division and F specifies it to the
F-15 Program.]
Thus the Navy's use of a charter is much more detailed ^^^
and the charter itself contains the specifics. It is issued
by Commander Naval Air Systems Command as delegated by the
Chief of Naval Material. The Air Force uses the charter which
is issued by OSD as authority for the Commander Air Force
Systems Command to issue his PMD containing needed specifics.
B. CHAIN OF COMMAND/INFORMATION FLOW
Paramount to any successful management effort is a coordi-
nated information system to ensure the proper flow of informa-
tion in the management hierarchy. In the military, of course,
this means Chain of Command.
The Navy's flow of information through the chain of com-
mand in aircraft acquisition is depicted on the following chart,
( Figure 2) . Figure 2
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
CHIEF OF NAVAL MATERIAL
COMMANDER NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND
PROJECT MANAGER
PROJECT MANAGEMENT
OFFICE AND STAFF M CONTRACTORI
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This diagrammed chain of command is theoretical in nature and
is the information flow contained in all official documents.
Realistically, of course, it is not this simple. There are many
circuitous routes involved and pressures levied by interest
groups that are not identified in the official chain of com-
mand. Noticeably absent, and paramount to any aircraft acquisi-
tion, is the organization that should be sitting on the top of the
hierarchy by virtue of control of funds. Congress.
The Secretary of Defense and his office make most of the
major decisions in aircraft acquisition. Number of aircraft
to be procured, number each fiscal year and continuation, al-
teration or discontinuance of an aircraft acquisition program
are generally the decision prerogatives retained by the SECDEF.
The SECDEF makes most of those decisions through the DSARCS
and by virtue of his position in the budgeting process. The
Secretary of the Navy's position in the information flow is to
filter out service prejudices and to ensure an Aircraft Acqui-
sition is in tune with the Navy's strategy and will enhance
its ability to meet the goals. The Chief of Naval Operations'
primary concern is with the technical capabilities of the air-
craft being procured ensuring it integrates into the force
structure and can accomplish its programmed mission. The Chief
of Naval Material is concerned mainly with cost control and
achieving a timely delivery of the aircraft being procured.
The Commander Naval Air Systems Command offers basically a
support and evaluation role. With his resources he tries to
ensure that the Program Manager is adequately prepared to carry
out the acquisition process. The decisions he retains deal
with how he will allocate his resources to the various aircraft
acquisitions under his purview and are based on need and an
evaluation of performance. The Project Manager of an Aircraft
Acquisition in the Navy is tasked with making tradeoff deci-
sions on cost, performance and delivery and is the general
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manager of the Acquisition Process on a day-to-day basis from
inception until the acquisition is complete.
Although there are many branches not officially depicted
in the information flow, the management information system is
structured to ensure all levels in the hierarchy receive ade-
quate information. Care is taken to ensure the chain of command
is properly exercised and bypassing a link in the chain is not
tolerated. This policy is emphasized through performance re-
porting. The Project Manager's performance is evaluated and
documented by the Commander Naval Air Systems Command. This
practice of the Reporting Senior being the next one up in the
chain strengthens the chain and helps ensure that the informa-
tion flow is smooth and adequate. The chain of command described
is the one utilized by the Navy throughout the entire life cycle
of any aircraft acquisition.
The Air Force's approach to the information flow and
the chain of command differs somewhat from the Navy. During
an aircraft acquisition the Air Force will usually utilize
two chains of command. These two chains are depicted and
labeled on the following chart (Figure 3 ) . Dual chains
of command during an Aircraft Acquisition Life Cycle is a
new procedure being tested by the Air Force with the F-15
acquisition. So far the Air Force feels it has been very suc-
cessful. The philosophy resulted from communications problems
experienced during the acquisition of the C-5A. The stream-
line chain of command and the corresponding management infor-
mation system is employed from program initiation through de-
ployment of the first few procurement lots. The streamlined
concept seems to serve a more useful purpose during this,, the
most critical time of the Acquisition process. It allows
quick and direct access by the Program Manager to higher




































It provides a streamlined route from the System Program Di-
rector to the AFSC Commander and to the Air Force Secretarial
level. This provides rapid information flow when waging the
political battle and ensures quick reaction time for the Air Force
Secretary when answering congressional questions. The decisions
retained and the prerogatives exercised by the SECDEF and his
office remain the same as discussed in Navy Aircraft Acquisition.
Also the concern and position of the Air Force Secretary is the
same as the Navy Secretary. The Air Force Chief of Staff in-
tegration and interaction in the chain is similar to that of
the CNO in the Navy Process. The Commander Air Force Systems
Command/ under the Chief of Staff, is responsible for all ac-
quisitions in the Air Force. Acquisition diversification for the
Commander AFSC is much more limited than for the CNM due to the
nature of the services missions and especially due to the gen-
erally one-faceted operational environment of the Air Force
versus the three-faceted operational environment of the Navy.
However, where CNM is responsible for only acquisitions the
AFSC responsibility scope is broader. The Commander AFSC is
also responsible for RDT&E (Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation) a responsibility delegated to an office of the CNO,
OP-98 in the Navy. In the streamlined mode of chain of com-
mand, the Commander AFSC is the Systems Program Director's
(Hrogram Manager) Reporting Senior. The Commander AFSC stresses
cost control and timely delivery and also ensures that the
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Systems Program Director has proper support. The Commander
AFSC directs the Commander Aeronautical Systems Division to
provide the support needed and, by surveillance and program
evaluation, exercises his position of determining priority among
Aircraft Acquisitions in Process.
The Blueline mode of information flow is usually employed
through a majority of the late Production and Deployment Phase.
It incorporates the Commander Aeronautical Systems Division
into the command chain and he becomes the Reporting Senior of the
Systems Program Director. It is felt that by the time the Blue-
line mode Chain of Command is utilized that the Aircraft Acquisi-
tion has reached a degree of stability, and immediate information
flow especially to the Service Secretariat level is not as cri-
tical. Also the SPO is being drawn down somewhat and the need
may arise to call on the ASD for functional expertise. The
Aeronautical System Division in the Blueline mode functions
much as the Naval Air Systems Command does in the Navy's Chain
of Command. It provides support to bridge the gap between the
technological base and satisfying the operational requirements
through expertise in specialty fields of procurement, test,
research, analysis, production and study all based on engi-
neering and management support from various deputy organiza-
tions. Due to the structural organization of the Air Force's
System Program Office, this specialty service is not utilized
that much, and the primary function of ASD is the shifting of
funds between Acquisitions where possible, and the evaluation
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and progress monitoring of all the aircraft acquisitions
reporting to the Commander Air Force Systems Command. The Aero-
nautical Systems Division is one of three product divisions of
the Air Force Systems Command and is concerned with aeronauti-
cal systems, aircraft and air-launched missiles.
Thus the Navy feels a uniform information flow with one ^
management information system servicing the Aircraft Acquisition
from cradle to grave provides the best results for its needs.
The Air Force on the other hand utilizes two Chains of Com-
mand during an Aircraft Acquisition Cycle seeing a need for a
more streamlined responsive information flow in the earlier
stages of the acquisition cycle. The organizational structure
of the Air Force's System Program Office provides the flexibi-
lity to employ these two different command chains. The Air
Force's System Program Office is organized as a self-contained
entity staffed with sufficient personnel thus providing the
prerogative of bypassing certain functional staffs with their
available expertise.
To cite our specific examples the F-14 utilized the stan-
dard chain of command from inception to the present. The F-15
utilized the streamline command chain from inception until March
of 1974 From March of 1974 to the present it has been func-
tioning under the Blueline Command Chain. The Air Force is
utilizing the concept of two command chains during an acqui-
sition cycle on its B-1 and F-16 programs.
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C. PROGRAM OFFICE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
In Aircraft Acquisition in both the Air Force and the
Navy the Program Manager is the individual responsible for
managing all activities concerned with planning and executing
the program. The ultimate success or failure of the Aircraft
Acquisition is the responsibility of the Program Manager. The
Program Manager's functional responsibilities in both ser-
vices are the same and can be likened to top-level executives
in any organization; that is planning, organizing, coordinating,
controlling and directing. The structure of his office or-
ganization through which he executes these functional respon-
sibilities represents the major difference in management ap-
proach to aircraft acquisition between the two services. As
was previously stated there are three types of organizational
structures utilized in Program Management offices. In Air-
craft Acquisition the Navy utilizes the Matrix organizational
structure while the Air Force employs the program organizational
structure. [The terms Project and Program when dealing with
aircraft acquisition are synonymous and term selection depends
upon the user and his orientation.]
The Navy's philosophy in utilizing the Matrix Organization
in Aircraft Acquisition lies in reaction, manpower shortages
and maximum utilization of the valuable resource, expertise.
A Project Office is created with a minimum staff. The staff
is divided up in functional responsibility by division, with
each division being responsible for a certain area of the
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acquisition process. As the Division head perceives a need for
analysis, study or detailed staff work, he draws upon existing
staffs and specialists in other organizations (external to the
Project Office) to accomplish the work. When the work is com-
pleted the specialty groups return to their parent organiza-
tion. The nucleus and continuity lies in the 15-3 people
typically permanently assigned to the Project Office. This
concept allows the Project Office to be quickly created and
staffed and involves very little phaseout when the acquisition
draws to a close. The Matrix concept also facilitates quick
reaction to any situation as it draws on already available
and experienced talent. The Navy's diversification in hardware
acquisition and the size of the acquisition process would very
heavily tax its already critically short manpower resource if
each acquisition office were staffed as a self-contained unit.
By drawing personnel from specialty staffs as the need arises/
conservation of a critical resource, manpower, is employed.
The Matrix concept also reflects the attitude of maximum utili-
zation of expertise. Specialists staffed in a Project Office
would not be fully or continually utilized as the needs are
not constant. However by being available to many acquisition
processes their talents are continually on demand and their
expertise is continually tasked. As with most any concept
there are drawbacks. The most obvious ones in the Matrix or-
ganization are trading off some of the Project Manager's
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responsibility and authority and having to prioritize the
demand for the specialty staffs. Since these specialty staffs
are not attached to the Project Office the Project Manager lacks
the direct Chain of Command authority and the powerful influence
this has over the specialty staffs. Also the demand for specialty
staffs between acquisitions at times must be prioritized. In
aircraft acquisition in the Navy this just necessitates the
Commander Naval Air Systems Command exercising his responsibi-
lity and assigning priorities. To be more specific, if the need
is perceived for technical help or engineering analysis in an
Aircraft Acquisition in the Navy, the Project Manager will call
on specialty staffs from NAVAIRSYSCOM primarily from the Office
of the Assistant Commander for Logistics/Fleet Support (Air 04)
or from the Office of the Assistant Commander for Material
Acquisition (Air 05) . If financial analysis is needed the
Assistant for Financial Control within the Project Office will
call upon the office of the NAVAIRSYSCOM Contracting Officer
who usually coordinates his efforts with the Navy Plant Reprer
sentative (NAVPRO) located at the contractor's facilities.
Appendix B is an organizational chart of the F-14 Project
Office and Appendix C is a breakdown of the people permanently
assigned to the office by their rank/grade and area of exper-
tise.
The Air Force Systems Program Office is a self-contained
entity capable of acquiring an aircraft without external
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assistance. When the Systems Program Office is established,
it is permanently staffed for the duration of the acquisition
with adequate subject matter expertise and specialist staffs
required for program accomplishment. The System Program Office
is broken up by functional responsibility into Divisions. The
Air Force feels that this type of Program Office organizational
structure enhances communications, coordination and control
and emphasizes the Systems Program Officer's management respon-
sibility and authority, and gives him wide latitude to manage
his Program Office to meet the technical objectives of his
14program.
The criticality. and sensitivity of an aircraft acquisition
necessitates the Program Manager having all the resources
needed to adequately manage his program under his control.
Having control and reporting authority over the Systems Pro-
gram Office personnel reemphasizes the attention these indi-
viduals are required to give to their functional responsibility,
The program organizational structure also has its draw-
backs. The time required for selection for staffing and the
intricate process or phasing out the office at the end of the
acquisition present problems. At times the staffed expertise
level is marginal because of having to spread the expertise
over all aircraft acquisition program offices.




The typical Systems Program Office for an aircraft ac-
quisition will contain between 150 and 300 people. The typical
Program Office structure and general divisions by functional
responsibility for the Air Force are shown in Appendix D. To
cite our specific example, the F-15 Systems Program Office
organizational chart is contained in Appendix E. Appendix F
is another organizational chart of the System Program Office
for the F-15 with personnel authorized to each of the func-
tional divisions. Appendix G is a breakdown of the personnel
assigned to the F-15 Systems Program Office by Rank/Grade
and by area of expertise.
In summary the Program Office in both services is a /^
management organization responsible for ensuring that all
participants perform their tasks during the various phases
of a system acquisition program. The effectiveness of the
Program Office is dependent upon the quality of performance
of the assigned individuals whether they be permanent or
temporary. The Program Offices are line elements of their
parent organization. The Program Manager is the overall
manager of all activities pertaining to his aircraft program.
He establishes detailed objectives, guidelines and require-
ments for the participating organizations, and tasks them
through the Program Office. If the Program Office fails,
the Program Manager fails and the acquisition is a failure.
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D. ASSIGNMENT, TRAINING, EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATION OF
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL
This is the most controversial area in the Program Man-
agement concept. There is general unison as to the viability
of the concept of the single manager with responsibility for
an aircraft acquisition. The controversy arises when one talks
about the personnel that are assigned to program management
billets, their tour lengths, educational background, compe-
tence, experience and motivation. The criticality of Program
Management necessitates highly qualified personnel in Program
Management billets. Conversations with the Air Force Systems
Command and the Naval Air Systems Command emphatically demon-
strated the intense screening process involved to fill program
management billets with quality personnel. Both services view
program management billets as highly visible, demanding and
career-enhancing
.
The Process starts with the selection and assignment of
a Program Manager. In the Air Force the selection process is
done by the Air Force Systems Command and they state the cri-
teria for selection as experience, performance and education
weighted in that order. In the Air Force the Program Manager
is generally of Flag Rank, typically a Brigadier General as in
the case of the F-15, C-5 and B-1.
In the Navy, selection of the Program Manager is conducted
by the Naval Air Systems Command, and they use the same
criteria as the Air Force in their selection process, only
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weighted in the order performance, experience and then
education. The Program Manager can be either a Captain or
of the Flag Rank, typically a Rear Admiral depending upon
the complexity and visibility of the Program. For example,
the F-14 Project Manager is a Rear Admiral, while the Project
Managers for the E-2C and the S-3A are both Captains.
An interesting difference was noted when investigating
the F-14 and F-15 programs that the author was unable to sub-
stantiate as a generalized aircraft acquisition approach dif-
ference between the two services. The Systems Program Directors
for the F-15 Program had all had some prior aircraft acquisition
experience. This was not found to be the case for the F-14 Pro-
ject Managers as two had had prior aircraft acquisition exper-
ience and two had not.
Once a Program Manager is selected, approved and assigned,
he then actively participates in the selection of personnel
both military and civilian to staff his Program Office. The
author found that the Navy's Project Manager had greater con-
trol over the selection process than did the Air Force's Systems
Program Director. The difference is directly attributable to
the size of the two staffs involved and when narrowed to key
staff personnel selection, both Program Officers were found to be
extremely influential in the selection process. Another point
of interest is that in both services the Program Manager's
influence in staff selection seems to dwindle as the Acquisition




Another major difference arises between the services'
management techniques when one examines length of duty tours in
program management billets. The Air Force has a stabilized
four-year duty tour in a project management billet with se-
lected key billets being extended to five years. This sta-
bilized four-year tour for its military personnel is standard
for two-thirds of the acquisition cycle and in the last one-
third of the acquisition cycle the tour will revert to three
years. The Navy on the other hand maintains a fairly constant
3 0-3 6 month tour of duty posture in its military program
management billets. Exceptions will arise but these are on
a case-to-case basis and are not the norm. As an example, the
F-14 and F-15 initial Program Managers were selected and as-
signed within one year of each other— the F-14 in 1968 and the
F-15 in 1969. Brigadier General Scurlock was recently assigned
as the third Systems Program Director for the F-15 program.
Rear Admiral Alvis is presently the fourth Project Manager for
the F-14 program and is due for rotation within the year.
The reasoning behind this difference in tour length is
hard to pinpoint and substantiate. The following theory
is that of the author and is based on perceptions gained
from conversations with personnel in the F-14 and F-15
Program Offices. The Navy's view is that a normal duty tour
consistent with those in other areas maintains a stable
career pattern. It also feels that if rotation is
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accomplished at other than a critical time in the acquisition
process and a proper turnover is conducted continuity is main-
tained. Program Management billets are usually pressure billets
where an individual can easily experience severe frustration.
By utilizing a normal duty tour it is felt a higher level of
motivation can be maintained and that the infusion of new ta-
lent into the program every 3 0-3 6 months is beneficial to the
Program. The Air Force on the other hand views continuity as
a key in its billet rotation. The general feeling is that one
does not become effective or productive in a Program Management
billet until he has about one year's experience. By utilizing
a longer tour of duty, individual output is increased and a
higher degree of continuity maintained.
In reality,/ continuity and experience in the Program Manage-
ment Office is provided by the civilian personnel on the staff.
They are generally attached to the program office for a longer
period of time, some for the entire program duration. In the
F-14 Project Office six of the civilians attached had been with
the program since its inception and in the F-15 Systems Program
Office 32 of the civilians attached had been with the program
since its inception. Although these civilian personnel occupy
key positions, they are not generally responsible for major
decisions. This usually rests with the military managers. Good
judgment in these major decisions typically is the result of
years of experience and training in the fields of technical
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performance, and business and financial management. This is
readily evident if one were to parallel Program Managers in
civilian industry versus Defense Acquisition. Key decisions
in the civilian industry are typically made by individuals
with years of experience and accumulated expertise. Presently
this is not the case in Defense Aircraft Acquisition. Career
patterns and duty tours prohibit the military program manager
from building the experience and expertise so essential. Lack
of experience is a readily acknowledged inequity and detriment
to the Aircraft Acquisition Process by both the Navy and the
Air Force.
The two services have tried to compensate for this experi-
ence inequity, somewhat, through education. A greater percen-
tage of those personnel being assigned to Program Management
Offices now have B.S./B.A. and Advanced Degrees. As a compari-
son, in a Report of the Long-Range Logistics Manpower Policy
Board of February 1969 published by the Office of Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) it was
stated that 38% of the 06 and above ranks in acquisition held
advanced degrees. Presently in Acquisition billets over 7 6%
of the 06 and above ranks hold advanced degrees. The Navy
and the Air Force have both created acquisition curricula at
their Advanced Degree Service Schools. Both curricula have
been established within the last five years and the objective
Telephone conversation with Office of Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Installations and Logistics) - Procurement.
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is not to try to catch up but to prepare for the future. The
Services have admitted their deficiencies and will accept them
for the present, but by providing advanced degree acquisition
education to Junior Grade Officers now, they hope to eliminate
this deficiency in the near future. The officer graduates of
these advanced degree acquisition programs are also being con-
sidered to have a specialty and are being utilized in that
specialty as a Junior Officer. This will help eliminate the
experiecne deficiency by preparing them for Program Manager
jobs in the future. All Program Managers in aircraft
acquisition programs in both services are now required
to be graduates of the DoD-sponsored Defense Systems Manage-
ment College located at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. This require-
ment will be considered satisfied if the prospective Program
Manager is a graduate of the acquisition programs of the Air
Force Institute of Technology or the Naval Postgraduate School.
The major difference between the two services lies in the
area of emphasis in their acquisition education programs. The
Air Force is almost totally technically oriented. They feel
that all officers are by maturation managers, but to be suc-
cessful in acquisition programs , need to develop an extensive
technical background.
The curriculum at the Air Force Institute of Technology
is structured to provide the needed technical background. The
Navy on the other hand structures its curriculum to produce a
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jack-of-all-trades. The acquisition curriculum contains
technically-oriented courses but it also contains courses
in financial management, organizational development and
communication and management information systems. The Navy
feels its acquisition curriculum graduates should have the
knowledge to know the technical objectives, plans and pro-
blems, the test plans and status; the integrated logistics
support plans, the financial status, the terms of the con-
tracts; the configuration management controls and production
scheduling, flow and delivery techniques if they are to be
competent acquisition managers.
Educational opportunities are being opened up to govern-
ment civilian procurement personnel also. The need to up-
grade the civilian procurement personnel's educational level
is obvious and both services are working in conjunction with
the Civil Service Commission to try to rectify a very serious
condition which is especially evident when one reflects on
the roles these civilian personnel play in the acquisition
process.
Appendixes H and I represent the educational background of
the personnel assigned to the F-14 Project Office and the F-15
Systems Program Office. The figures are not "double-counted"
and it is interesting to note the high concentration of master's
degree in management in the F-15 System Program Office despite
the technical orientation of their acquisition programs. The
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percentage of people attached to the two offices with either
a bachelors or masters degree is similar, with the F-15 having
72% and the F-14 being 70%. In comparing percentages of of-
fice personnel having masters degrees the Navy has 43% while
the Air Force has 3 9%. In comparing management versus engi-
neering we find the Air Force's F-15 office having 49% of its
personnel holding degrees in management and 24% holding
degrees in engineering. In the F-14 Project office 18% of
personnel assigned hold management degrees while 53% hold
engineering degrees.
E. PMP - PREPARATION AND USE
PMP is an abbreviation used by both the Navy and the Air
Force that identifies two different documents that do the
same thing. In the Navy PMP stands for Project Master Plan.
In the Air Force PMP stands for Program Management Plan. In
essence they both are documents describing the strategy the
Program Manager adapts in managing his aircraft acquisition.
After observing civilian industry and through experience
the need for a thorough coordinated and well documented plan
for managing aircraft acquisition programs became evident. The
PMP was established in both services. This plan provides the
method of operation, tasking and responsibilities of the divi-
sions in the Program Office. It should be tailored to provide
the minimum essential information needed to outline the over-
all management plan for the program. It is a compilation of
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all planning documents which places in context the plans,
schedules, costs and scope of all work and resources to be
provided by each participating organization. It deals with
program management, logistics, manpower and organization,
personnel training, test and evaluation, system engineering,
intelligence, communications and Program summary and authori-
zation. In short the PMP defines the Program Manager's man-
agement approach for acquiring a system and provides a guide
and a checklist for the Program Manager to execute his re-
sponsibilities and evaluate his progress.
Although the basic concept of the PMP is the same in both
services, its creation, issuance and approval are different.
In the Navy, NAVMATINST 5200. llA specifies that the PMP will
be prepared by the Program Manager as his initial task once
assigned. The Project Manager's only guidance is that the
document should provide uniform direction for work planning and
scheduling and provide basic dociimentation which coordinates ef-
fort for his project. Once prepared it is submitted to the
Commander Naval Air Systems Command for review, approval and
issuance. It is issued in entirety and revised annually or
whenever a significant change occurs in the status of the ac-
quisition. Even though the PMP is prepared by the PM it bears
the Commander Naval Air Systems Command signature. In the Air
Force the Program Manager is given specific details and guide-
lines as to what the PMP should contain. This is provided by
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the Program Management Directive (PMD) . Although the PMD
has been cited before in discussing the creation of the Program
Office, further amplification is appropriate. The
PMD is the official Headquarters United States Air Force man-
agement directive used to provide program direction to Air
Force Systems Command and the Program Manager. The PMD will
define the responsibilities of the participating commands,
state requirements, initiate, approve, change, modify or term-
inate programs. It parallels the Navy's charter in context.
The PMD will be supplemented by the Air Force Systems Command
Form 56, the official AFSC management document providing pro-
gram direction to the Program Managers. Armed with the PMD
and AFSC Form 56, the Program Management Plan will be developed
and issued by the Program Manager. The PMP is the principal
management baseline document for the program and the Program
Manager is his own approving authority as to the PMP ' s context.
The PMP should reflect the integrated time-phased tasks and
resources required to accomplish the task specified in the
PMD supplemented by AFSC Form 56, but the Program Manager ap-
proves it and a copy is furnished to higher authority simply
for infoirmation. The PMP is usually issued incrementally rather
than in entirety in the Air Force. The Program Managers issue
only that portion he deems necessary for that specified period.
Whether issued incrementally or in entirety, the PMP is updated




Good management technique dictates that the manager have
a plan that states goals and objectives and a strategy that delin-
eates means of achieving them. The PMP provides this management
tool for both services in Aircraft Acquisition Management. It
is the program management nucleus in aircraft acquisition for
the PM and his Office.
F. DSARC PREPARATION AND DCP CONSTRUCTION
The DSARC and its function have been previously mentioned.
This section will attempt to emphasize its importance and
describe the differences in DSARC preparation and DCP construc-
tion between the Air Force and the Navy.
The review conducted by the Defense Systems Acquisition Re-
view Council (DSARC) at key system decision points in the air-
craft acquisition process is held for the purpose of ensuring
that the service has a viable program and is ready to proceed
to the next phase of acquisition. It is the responsibility of
the Program Manager to provide the DSARC with the pertinent
information it needs to make its recommendations regarding
the program to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF)
.
The DEPSECDEF then makes the key system decision (proceed,
modify, or cancel) based in part on the DSARC ' s recommendation.
This high-level decision hinges on the effective, impressive
and knowledgeable presentation by the Program Manager. He
must use all the facilities and management expertise available
to him to prepare for the DSARC. The Program Manager is in
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competition with other Programs for the scarce resource, funds.
All Programs are considered essential for National Defense and
the DSARC provides the function of prioritizing the Programs
within the Department of Defense. The very existence of an
aircraft acquisition program can depend upon the Program Man-
ager's presentation. Personally, a Program Manager strives to
succeed to enhance career possibilities.
The two basic differences between the Navy and the Air Force
in DSARC preparation are: (1) The Air Force has developed an
extensive technically oriented checklist for use by their Pro-
gram Managers in preparation for a DSARC review while the Navy
has no such "cook-book" type of checklist; (2) The Navy has an
extensive pre-review process while the Air Force utilizes just
two pre-reviews.
The Air Force feels a standardized checklist provides uni-
formity and standardization to the preparation procedure. It
ensures that all major areas are covered and assists in format-
ting the technical areas of the Program that experience has
proven are considered most important by the DSARC. The Navy
does not use an official checklist because it considers the
interface between the Project Manager, NAVAIRSYSCOM and the
Naval Material Command, coupled with the pre-DSARC reviews, to
be sufficient. The Navy feels flexibility is the key to ade-
quate DSARC presentation. It is felt that a DSARC ' s interests
vary depending upon the program and, by obligating the Project
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Manager to a standardized checklist/ you remove the individuality
needed for each DSARC presentation.
The pre-DSARC review is a concept used by both services.
It allows senior service personnel, who have been involved in
previous DSARCs, to critique the Program Manager's presentation
after he and his office have prepared and polished it. The
number of these reviews is the primary difference between the
Navy and the Air Force. The Air Force conducts just two reviews
prior to the actual DSARC: (1) Air Staff Review chaired by the
Deputy Chief of Staff (R&D) and (2) Joint Secretary of Air Force
and Chief of Staff of the Air Force Review. The Air Force feels
that standardized preparation necessitates only these two pre-
reviews. The number of pre-reviews in the Navy is not stan-
dardized and varies but is always in excess of two. Sometimes
more than one pre-review at every echelon in the Command Chain
is held. The Navy realizes that these reviews put heavy de-
m.ands on the Program Manager's time, but they tend to better
service credibility at the DSARC because reiterations improve
the presentation.
The Decision Coordination Paper (DCP) is the official
document that supports the Program Manager at the DSARC and
from which he draws out the points to be made in his presen-
tation. It defines program issues, including: special logis-
tics problems; program objectives; program plans; performance
parameters; areas of major risk; system alternatives and
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aircraft acquisition strategy. It allows the DSARC an in-
depth look at all program factors before financial resources
are heavily committed to the program. After the DSARC ' s re-
view and the DEPSECDEF's decision, the DCP becomes a form of
contract between the service and OSD relating to the future
conduct of the aircraft acquisition program.
There is a significant difference between the Air Force
and the Navy in the way they construct a DCP for DSARC re-
view on an aircraft acquisition program. The Air Force has
a standard checklist of 18 items that it uses in formulating
its DCP. The DCP is complete and officially signed, usually
by the Commander Air Force Systems Command prior to the DSARC.
The Navy does not utilize a standard checklist in con-
structing its DCP and many times enters into DSARC review
prior to completion and review of its program's DCP. The
Navy justifies this with the argument that prior to the DSARC
review, resolution of major issues is not complete and the final
DCP cannot be consummated until resolution of these issues.
Further, the Navy contends that a non-finalized DCP provides
the DSARC more flexibility regarding its recommendation to
DEPSECDEF. At the DSARC review new alternatives can be pro-
posed as a result of the meaningful interchange between the
service and the DSARC principals. The changes can be entered
in the DCP and significant coordination time can be saved.




Regardless of the differences in formalizing the DCP and
preparing for DSARC review, both services agree on one key
point. If the program manager is to give an effective DSARC
presentation and expect approval of his DCP he must be pre-
pared to cope with opposition to his basic assumptions at all
times. He should carefully consider all contingencies and be
prepared to counter opposition to all areas of controversy.
DSARC preparation and DCP formulation is done internally
in the Program Office in both services with staff service
being provided by NAVAIRSYSCOM for the Navy's Project Office.
Both services also conduct extensive liaison with OSD in pre-
paring for the DSARC and in constructing the DCP.
G. TRAINING AND LOGISTICS
Besides direct acquisition of the aircraft, there are two
other areas in which a Program Manager has responsibility.
Historically these have been very weak areas in the total pro-
gram concept. The Program Manager gets so involved in the
Aircraft Acquisition Process itself that he at times seems to
forget that he is also responsible for developing an integrated
logistics system to support the aircraft when deployed and for
ensuring adequately trained personnel are available to operate
and maintain the aircraft in a deployed status. These have
been sorely neglected facets of the acquisition process and a
major effort is underway to upgrade this aspect in both services
Both services will readily admit that if tradeoff decisions were
necessitated in aircraft acquisition programs and internal
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reprograinining of funds took place the money supposedly dedi-
cated to the logistics of the aircraft is the first to be drawn
from. In such cases an aircraft is deployed without adequate
spares resulting in such consequences as 20% availability on
the Navy's S-3 and 34% availability on the Air Force's C-5.
Paralleling this is the essential need for personnel develop-
^
ment programs, both in the Air Force and Navy. The way these
two functions are handled by the Program Manager through his
office offers an interesting contrast in approach.
In personnel development programs for new aircraft systems,
the Navy is guided by BuPersInst 5400.2, which directs that a
Project Manager is responsible for the development of personnel
requirements and ultimately adequate manning for the Weapon
System Acquisition that he is managing. This function is as-
signed by the Project Manager to his Training Officer, usually
a Navy Commander. The Training Officer must rely completely on
specialty staffs entirely outside the Acquisition Command Chain.
Liaison is conducted with the Bureau of Naval Personnel and,
through the Bureau, the Training Device Center at Orlando,
Florida, to ensure adequate manning and training plans are
developed. This includes personnel assignment and the design
of maintenance schools and curriculums to ensure the availability
of an adequate level of technical expertise. Working through
OP-05 and the Bureau, the Training Officer ensures the develop-
ment of crew training programs. All of this is done external
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to the Project Office and is monitored by the Training Officer
who reports progress to the Project Manager.
The Air Force's concept is a bit different in the training
area. The Air Training Command is the Air Force's functional
organization responsible for training concepts, training plans,
trained personnel requirements, individual training (initial
and replacement) . This command has established a resident Train-
ing Command Office at the Aeronautical Systems Division which
comes under the responsibility of the Commander Aeronautical
Systems Division. [The Commander ASD is the Reporting Senior
for the people attached to this resident ATC Office.] This
office is thus in the Acquisition Command Chain and supports
the various System Program Offices. It develops and provides
all the training concepts and plans for the Aircraft Systems,
the trained people and the training facilities, as well as
assisting in the acquisition of much of the training equipment
for both maintenance personnel and operators.
The Integrated Logistics Support Program in either service's
aircraft acquisition cycle consists of logistic concepts, logi-
stics plans, material support plans, test support equipment,
medical services, warehousing maintenance (Depot level), main-
tenance (Field level), and distribution systems. What this re-
duces to is ensuring that spares, tools and equipment to fix
parts, and ground support equipment are available when the
aircraft is made operational.
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In both the Air Force and the Navy there is a functional
division in the Program Office responsible for Integrated
Logistics Support. In both services this office branch is
headed by an 0-5. The similarity ends here, however. The
Navy Integrated Logistics Support Program is headed by the
Project Office Branch head but the actual program development
is done by the Office of the Assistant Commander for Logistics/
Fleet Support in NAVAIRSYSCOM. The Air Force, on the other
hand will establish a Program Cadre in the Systems Program
Office of people from the Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC)
,
which is a command that is not in the Acquisition Command
chain. The entire Logistics Support Program is developed en-
tirely within the System Program Office by AFLC people who are
responsible to the Program Manager. The guiding directive for
both services in the area of Integrated Logistic Support is
DoD Directive 4100.35.
H. USER REPRESENTATION AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS
The Air Force employs a unique concept by having a Using
Command Representative attached to the Systems Program Office.
This face-to-face liaison between the Program Manager and the
User's representative has been felt to be extremely beneficial
by the Air Force. This Using Command representative assures
that, as the ultimate customer, its true requirements are
continuously reflected in the systems planning and actions
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during acquisition. The influence of the Using Command repre-
sentatives is essential during the early part of the System
Life Cycle. Although this representation is more of a liaison
nature than a direct large-scale participation, experience
proves that their presence provides insurance that the Using
Command's desires and requirements are carefully considered
especially during the validation phase.
The Navy does not utilize this Using Command Project Office
Representative Concept. It does, however, conduct liaison by
message traffic and phone to the aircraft's eventual users to
ensure their inputs are filtered into the program.
In the Continental United States, the Air Force's Program
Manager has the responsibility for ensuring that the local com-
munity is prepared for the deployment of the aircraft and for
maintaining the goodwill of the local citizens throughout the
activation program.
The Navy tasks the Using Command and Base Commanders with
this Community Relations function when in CONUS
.
In overseas operations, the State Department, or Foreign
Government involved have the authority and the organization to
carry out the Community Relations program. The Program Manager
in both services must support the public relations program by
providing films, informational material, and so forth, and en-
suring that remedial action is taken immediately upon the
occurrence of any adverse incident under his responsibility.
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I. ON-SITE DIRECT REPRESENTATION
An interesting area of difference in aircraft acquisition
strategy between the two services centers on an issue that has
been controversial since the Program Management Concept's in-
ception, this being whether or not a representative from the
Program Management Office should be located at the contractor's
primary facilities to provide on-site representation.
The Air Force in 1974 withdrew its F-15 Systems Program Of-
fice representative from the McDonnell Douglas production plant.
The Air Force feels that the liaison existing between the Pro-
gram Office and the Air Force Plant Representative Office
(AFPRO) which is permanently located at the McDonnell Douglas
facilities satisfied any representation need that the Program
Office had. In a discussion with the F-15 Systems Program
Office the attitude exhibited was that any representation that
was needed on-site between the Program Office and the contrac-
tor could be satisfactorily handled through the intermediary
AFPRO. The F-15 Systems Program Office had not experienced any
difficulties in utilizing the AFPRO even though they are not
part of the Program Command Chain. It was felt that duplication
of effort and waste of a valuable resource, talented manpower,
were resulting from the direct representative concept. The
Air Force is presently not employing an on-site program office
representative in the acquisition of the B-1 or the F-16.
In contrast, in 1973 the Navy felt that substantial benefits
could be gained if a Program Office representative was assigned
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on-site. This was a new concept for the Navy and basically
is in a trial stage with the F-14 program. The reason for
this move had nothing to do with the ability of the Navy Plant
Representative Office (NAVPRO) in providing liaison with the
contractor. The NAVPRO ' s interests at Grumman were more di-
versified than just monitoring the F-14 Program (Grumman also
produces components for missiles, produces the E-2C, the A-6
and the E-A6) and they were unable to give the F-14 program
their complete attention during a very critical time in the
Acquisition Cycle. Consequently a Commander was attached to
the NAVPRO Office at Grumman ' s Bethpage facilities who is di-
rectly responsible to the F-14 Program Manager. In conversa-
tions with the F-14 Project Office I found the attitude to be
extremely favorable to this arrangement especially considering
the problems Grumman faced in the F-14 production. The basic
concept has been very beneficial and a Project Office Represen-
tative on-site will be utilized in the F-18 program.
J. GEOGRAPHICAL DISPERSION
In aircraft acquisition there is no geographical dispersion
in the command responsibility line in the Navy, while the Air
Force experiences geographical dispersion. The Chain of Com-
mand for the two services in aircraft acquisition has been dis-
cussed. In the Navy, the Office of Chief of Naval Material, the
Office of the Commander Naval Air Systems Command and the Project
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Manager's Office with all their supporting functional staffs
are located in Crystal City, Arlington, Virginia. The Pro-
ject Manager and the Conmiander Naval Air Systems Command are
in the same building complex and within walking distance of
the Office and support complex for the Chief of Naval Material.
Crystal City is approximately two miles south of the Pentagon
which provides ease of accessability to the CNO, the Secretary
of the Navy and the Secretary of Defense and their offices.
This arrangement pools the various echelon resources, provides
almost immediate face to face contact between members of the
Command Chain and facilitates program presentation to the
holder of the purse strings. Congress. This can be an asset
in the acquisitions' never-ending political battle. A major-
ity of the major consulting firms utilized by the Department
of Defense are also located near the Crystal City area and
this enhances response time to the Navy's needs in its Air-
craft Acquisition Process.
The Air Force, on the other hand, finds its Aircraft Ac-
quisition Command Chain geographically dispersed. The Com-
mander, Air Force Systems Command headquarters is located at
Andrews Air Force Base, outside Washington. It is approximately
twelve miles east of the Pentagon, where the Air Force Chief of
Staff, Secretary of the Air Force and the Secretary of Defense
and their offices are located. The Commander/ Aeronautical
Systems Division and the Program Manager and their offices and
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functional staffs are located at Wright-Patterson Air Force
Base, Ohio. In talking with representatives from the F-15
Systems Program Office, I found the attitude to be generally
favorable to this arrangement. The isolation and shielding
this geographical dispersion provided the Systems Program
Office greatly reduced the time spent responding to inquiries
on a face to face basis, lessened, to a degree, external inter-
ference and allowed the Systems Program Office to concentrate
on their primary job of managing the Aircraft Acquisition
Process.
K. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
In comparing the two services' approaches and techniques
in the area of financial management the only real distin-
guishable difference revolved around the staff work provided
by the NAVAIRSYSCOM Comptroller and Contracts Office in help-
ing the Navy's Program Manager in budget formulation and
execution. This is handled exclusively within the office in
an Air Force Systems Program Office. However, the author feels
that the area is of such importance and has such grave conse-
quences that a discussion of financial management in Aircraft
Acquisition is fundamental to understanding the Acquisition
Process
.
Of the last ten airplanes produced for the government by




over ceiling price. This only includes aircraft whose pro-
duction runs are complete and the ceiling price was adjusted
for inflation. Cost changes for aircraft acquisitions can be
basically broken down in the following way:
25% - comes from inaccuracy in cost and performance esti-
mating^ on the part of DoD and the Contractor.
30% - inflation.
45% - specification changes. This includes time schedules,
quantities or engineering changes. Much of this type
of cost growth results from unrealistic performance
targets at the outset and trying to develop and pro-
18duce the system too fast.
In talks with the F-14 and F-15 Program Offices, the follow-
ing became readily evident. A proper budget preparation
and execution with the prevention of cost overruns are signi-
ficant in deciding whether an aircraft acquisition is tagged
a success or a failure. Public and Congressional pressure
truly dictate policy on this issue and have put the Program
Managers in a defensive situation which influences tradeoffs.
They are forced to manage and evaluate on the basis of cost
control with other measures of efficiency and effectiveness
taking a back seat.
17
"Why Military Airplanes Cost So Much and What Can Be Done
About It," Air University Review, November-December , 197 3
,
pp. 94-100.
18Webb, Donald E., Thesis
—
The Study of Cost Growth of a
Major Weapon System, December 1974.
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In essence there are really two parallel decision cycles
that any aircraft acquisition is constantly involved in.
These two parallel decision cycles are the Fiscal Cycle which
is passed through each year; and the other is the Life Cycle
which is passed through just once. While these cycles do
run in parallel, they do interact and can radically affect
one another. The Life Cycle is the time it takes a program to
go from basic research and a gleam in someone's
eye, through development, production and deployment. The
Fiscal Cycle is the annual planning, programming, budgeting,
and enactment and apportionment activity. Major decisions in
the Life Cycle of an aircraft acquisition have already been
discussed. Key decisions in the Fiscal Cycle would be DoD
and the involved service planning and funding and finally the
most crucial decision in the acquisition program: will Con-
gress appropriate funds for the program and to what degree?
In reality all other decisions in either cycle are based on
Congressional funding.
The Program Manager is really the Commanding Officer of
his Program tasked with yearly budget formulation, projection
of long-range needs for his program, including entire life
cycle costs, executing his budget and especially maintaining
costs within the approved budget. To be competent in his
Financial Management responsibility, a Program Manager must
understand PPBS, the FYDP , appropriations, apportionments,
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operating budgets, costing techniques, intricacies of finan-
cial analysis, details of progress payments and he must have
at his disposal individuals who can work in these critical
areas to ensure resource control. This is imperative if a
Program Manager is to keep his program competitive for scarce
resources. Congress carries the power of the purse strings
and if a Program Manager is not accurate and credible in his
budget formualtion and execution it can destroy the Program.
In 1972 the Navy added an Assistant for Financial Control
to their Aircraft Project Offices. He is responsible to the
Deputy for control and assists and advises in all the financial
management areas previously mentioned. The Air Force has a
Resources Management Division in their Systems Program Office
which is tasked with financial management responsibility and
has been so incorporated in Systems Program Offices since 1971.
The need for sound financial management in aircraft acqui-
sitions is paramount. Again both services admit the expertise
and experience are lacking. Individuals are being prepared
for this financial management responsibility and are being de-
signated as specialists but the need for them is so great in all
areas of service operation that many times the Aircraft Acqui-
sitions Programs receive low priority for this expertise. In
an attempt to counter this and provide the expertise so criti-
cally needed, the Department of Defense has originated an In-
dustry Financial Management Course for Program Managers at the
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Defense Systems Management College at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
Not only Program Managers, but office staff, are being schooled
here and the present thinking in both services is to try to
build an expertise level in the civilian acquisition personnel
especially since they provide the continuity in an aircraft
acquisition program.
L. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITY TRANSFER AND TURNOVER
One of the major differences in Aircraft Acquisition Manage-
ment occurs toward the end of the acquisition cycle.
In the Navy's Aircraft Acquisition philosophy, the Program
Manager manages the acquisition program until the last aircraft
rolls off the production line and has been delivered, along
with all its supporting equipment. At this time the Project
Office charter expires, the Office is disbanded and people re-
assigned. Control and responsibility for the aircraft is then
the purview of OPNAV which filters down the command chain with
fleet aircraft ownership usually resting with COMNAVAIRPAC or
COMNAVAIRLANT.
The Air Force approach is radically different. The Pro-
gram Manager under the Air Force Systems Command has program
management responsibility up to the production phase of the
program. Sometime during the production phase responsibility
for the aircraft acquisition program management is transferred
to the Air Force Logistics Command. This transfer is aptly
named Program Management Responsibility Transfer (PMRT) . The
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PMRT date is a calendar date that is negotiated between AFSC
and AFLC and is selected based upon particular program needs,
critical ity, with the full intent to effect PMRT as early
as possible. Immediately following the approval of full scale
development Transfer Working (groups (TWG) are formed to assist
in the selection of the PMRT date and in the planning and im-
plementation of PMRT. The TWG includes representatives from
AFSC/ AFLC and other involved commands. The Group is charged
with planning and implementing a fully-coordinated, orderly,
timely and efficient sequence of events leading to a success-
ful PMRT.
Headquarters USAF approves the PMRT date and AFSC and AFLC
must jointly review the program management responsibilities
far enough in advance to accommodate PMRT and the Planning,
Programming and Budgeting Cycle to ensure consideration of
funding requirements for all tasks. Systems Program Office
phaseout is also coordinated around PMRT with specific nego-
tiated divisions of the office remaining intact, tracking post-
PMRT residual tasks performed by the Program Manager until
they are completed. The ultimate responsibility for PMRT
planning lies with the Program Manager.
The reasoning behind this approach is rather simple. Deli-
very and support of the aircraft is a logistics function and
more easily handled by the Air Force Logistics Command.
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Turnover, of course, is the point when the operating com-
mand formally accepts responsibility from the implementing
command for the operation and maintenance of the aircraft.
This quite naturally takes place between the AFLC and the
TAG command receiving the aircraft. To cite a specific exam-
ple, the F-15 program anticipates PMRT in 1980 immediately
after the last lot is procured with turnover occurring in late
1982. The Navy's F-14 Project Office will manage the F-14
Program up to the point of turnover which is presently sche-
duled for late in 1979.
IV. SIMILARITIES
.
Although the major topic of this thesis is differences in
Aircraft Acquisition Management between the Air Force and the
Navy, it is appropriate to include a brief discussion of the
similarities, for they by far outnumber and overshadow the
differences
.
The similarities, of course, arise from a common boss,
the Secretary of Defense and DoD Directives govern a majority
of the acquisition techniques and practices employed by the
services. A listing of the ones considered major might help
in understanding the complicated world of Aircraft Acquisition.
1, Program Manager - Individual with centralized authority
and responsibility for entire Acquisition Management.




3. Contracts - cost plus for R&D and fixed-price incen-
tives for production.
4. Payments - done by Progress Payment Method.
5. Total Package Procurement - eliminated - F-14 and F-15
last aircraft acquisition in both services to employ this
concept.
6. Fly-before-buy - utilized. F-14 and F-15 first air-
craft acquisitions for each service to use this concept.
7. Historical Costing - eliminated.
8. Should Cost Analysis - employed.
9. Design to Cost - employed. F-14 and F-15 first air-
craft acquisitions in each service to utilize design to cost
methods.
10. PERT, CPM and CER - utilized.
11. PPBS - employed.
12. Operating Budgets - Each aircraft acquisition in either
service has its own operating budget and the Program Manager has
RS 3679 responsibility.
13. Utilization of Consulting Firms - done by both ser-
vices especially to provide business expertise.
14. Computerized Management Information Systems - utilized
and almost identical in structure.




These are a few of the major management concepts and tech-
niques utilized in aircraft acquisition that were not mentioned
extensively in the context of this thesis and may have left the
reader unsure of their integration. It suffices to say that
they are an extremely important part of aircraft acquisition
management and were not mentioned because of their similarity
in use between the two services.
V. PROBLEM AREAS AND AVENUES OF SOLUTION
IN THE F-14 AND F-15 PROGRAMS
The F-14 and F-15 System Program Goals were almost identical
in nature and can be generally summarized by the following state-
ment: "Produce and deliver the air superiority fighter within
the approved program which delineates cost, schedule and tech-
nical performance parameters." Both services have done very
well in meeting planned program schedule and technical per-
formance parameters but have experienced difficulties in main-
taining original program cost parameters. Many reasons have
been pro posed as to why the biggest management headache for
an aircraft acquisition program manager is cost control. Fluc-
tuating economy, inflation, uncertainty in the financial en-
vironment, poor management practices, paternalism, overoptimism
by the service and contractor, "buying-in," and historical
costing techniques have been a few of the major reasons that
have been offered. The answer may lie in one or maybe all of
these reasons and concepts have been developed to try to
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counter cost overruns and exhibit better cost control. Re-
gardless of the reasons, or the formulated answer to these
reasons, cost control historically has been, presently is,
and I predict will be the major problem area in aircraft ac-
quisition. Perhaps there is no answer or there are so many
factors operating that the process is beyond human control.
The F-14 and F-15 programs were no exceptions to the estab-
lished trends and saw cost control as the biggest management
challenge.
The F-14 Program experienced severe problems revolving
around contractor financing from the period of late 1971 to
the fall of 1974. Before the actual problem and its resolution
are discussed, I would like to reflect on some conversations
with the F-14 Project Office on the problem that may help to
lend insight. The Project Office foresaw the problem before
it reached "crisis" level but were almost totally helpless to
do anything about it. The Project Office felt Grumman had
perhaps been overoptimistic in their cost estimates for the
production lots contract and perhaps had even engaged in "buying-
in." The Project Office was unable to control other areas of
Grumman business strategy not related to the F-14 program con-
tract and when the problem finally surfaced in sufficient
magnitude to warrant top-level attention, the Project Office
and the Navy were forced into a defensive posture and had to
resort to a common but not recommended management technique
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known as "crisis management." The Project Office felt
extreme frustration.
On 31 March 1971, Grumman first formally asserted that
economic factors beyond their control, inflation and loss of
projected business, made performance of Lots IV through VIII
commercially impractical. The Navy investigated and con-
cluded that inflation and loss of business were causing in-
creased costs. It was also determined that Grumman delays in
getting their subcontractors and vendors on contract and Grum-
man directed changes had also caused significant cost increases
It was further determined that Navy program costs would be
lower if the tightly priced contract could be preserved, de-
spite Grumman ' s loss forecast, which, it was recognized, could
worsen upon further loss or failure to make significant re-
trenchments. It was also determined that Grumman could per-
form the Lot IV option for 4 8 aircraft unimpaired. More
serious financial problems were foreseen in the performance
of Lots V through VIII.
As a result of the Defense Systems Acquisition Review of
June 1971, DEPSECDEF approved a restructured production program
for procurement of 3 01 aircraft. On 27 July 1971, Grumman for-
mally advised the Navy they would perform Lot IV and on 3 Sep-
tember 1971, the LOT IV option for 48 aircraft was exercised.
In January of 1972 Grumman announced an estimated loss of
$111,000,000 on the F-14 airplanes for Lots I through IV. This
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loss was offset by profit of $46,000,000 on F-14 spares,
support and R&D effort. On 20 January 1972, Grumman informed
the Navy by letter that the Navy's further options were con-
sidered invalid, further option exercises could not be accep-
ted, the company would build further aircraft at negotiated
fair prices, but that the contract would require restructuring
During March and April of 1972, the Senate Armed Services
Committee held hearings exploring program status. Navy and
Grumman positions, and the financial impact on Grumman of com-
pleting the 313 airplane program. The Navy asserted in Con-
gressional testimony that there was a valid contract, but that
more substantive cost data was required for a firm decision
concerning future options. The Navy's basic position was to
protect the Government's interest while proposing a course of
action that would insure a viable program. Grumman claimed it
could not perform Lot V citing inflation, loss of business
base and the inability to acquire further commercial credit.
Grumman stated it was left with no alternative but to reject
the Lot V option.
On 28 April 1972, Grumman, faced with no available com-
mercial credit, requested increased progress payments from the
normal 80% to 90 or 100% to keep production moving. The Navy
concluded that advance payments under 10 U.S. Code 23 07 were
the best way to assist Grumman with required financing. On
8 August 1972, for the first time in the Navy's Aircraft
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Acquisition history, an advance payments agreement was executed
which was initially limited to $20,000/000. Advance payments
were increased by $16,000,000 on 15 September and by $18,000,000
on 28 December. Advance procurement funds were released in ac-
cordance with contract modification and without prejudice to
either parties' position regarding validity of the option.
On 26 September 1972, Public Law 92-436 authorized the FY
1973 DoD appropriation with the stipulation that $510,100,100
would be available for an F-14 aircraft program of not less
than 48 aircraft subject to: (1) not increasing the selling
price for the LOT V option in the F-14 contract between the
Navy and the primary airframe contractor, except in accordance
with the terms of such contract, including the clause providing
the normal technical changes; and (2) the Navy exercising the
option for LOT V on or before 1 October 197 2 or any subsequent
date prior to 31 December 1972 as may be mutually agreed upon
by the Navy and the contractor without additional cost to the
Government and within the present contract terms and conditions;
(3) provided that in the event the Secretary of Defense deter-
mines that any condition prescribed in Clause (1) or (2) cannot
be met, he shall report such fact to the Congress within 90
days after such determination, together with his recommendations
regarding the future of the F-14 program.
Pursuant to the Congressional authorization, LOT V option
exercises date was extended from 1 October to 15 December 1972.
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In October of 1972 the Navy began intensive informal discussions
with Grumman which brought about general agreement on many fun-
damental .production and financial provisions, but no agreement
on Lot V performance.
On 14 November 1972, Grumman ' s 3rd Quarter Report accounted
for an additional $20,000,000 loss on LOTS I through IV. On
16 November 1972 the Navy advised Grumman of its intention to
exercise the LOT V option and requested the company's formal
position. On 17 November 1972 Grumman replied by letter stating
that nothing which had happened since January 20, 197 2 had im-
proved their financial situation; that they could not accept
such option and they would have no recourse but to assert their
legal position that the options were invalid; and that they had
a wholehearted desire to find an acceptable solution to the
critical contract problem which both parties faced. On 8 De-
cember 1972 the Navy exercised the LOT V option. On December
11, 1972, Grumman rejected the option exercise, advised it
would cease all LOT V effort, and immediately issued LOT V
stop-work orders to its vendors and subcontractors.
Discussions between Grumman and Navy teams continued. On
1 March 1973, a contracting officer's decision determined the
option exercise was valid and required resumption of LOT V
performance. On 8 March 1973, an agreement was reached which
required Grumman to perform all contract obligations regarding
Lots I through V and entailed Grumman ' s forfeiture of all rights
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to challenge the validity of, enforceability of or exercise
of options for Lots I through V. The Navy agreed to forego
any option subsequent to Lot V and to increase the progress
payment rate or relax certain advance payment agreement
covenants.
On 4 April 1973, the request for proposals for the FY 1974
F-14 aircraft program was issued. On 9 April 1973 a SECNAV
Memorandum of Decision authorized deletion of Lot VI through
VIII options and required a waiver by Grumman of their right
to contest the validity of the contract and options through
Lot V. In July, a Senate Armed Services Committee letter to
DEPSECDEF limited FY 1974 F-14 authorization to $197,600,000
long-lead through December 1973. It also recommended FY74
negotiations for 50 F-14A aircraft be completed by the end of
August and expressed frustration over the delay in Lot IV and
V negotiations. On 26 July 1973, Grumman submitted their pro-
posal for 50 FY1974 aircraft. On 31 August 1973, the defini-
tized Lot IV (FY72) and Lot V (FY73) contracts were presented
to the Senate Armed Services Committee Staff. The proposed
FY74 contract was also presented and on 24 September this con-
tract was agreed to by Grumman -iand the Navy, providing there
was no substantial change by subsequent Congressional action.
During the fall of 1973 and the spring of 1974, negotiations
continued between Grumman and the Navy on financial arrangements




additional advance payment requirements. In January of 1974,
the Government of Iran had officially entered into an agree-
ment with the U. S. Navy to purchase 3 F-14 aircraft. They
subsequently agreed to purchase 50 more aircraft in June of
1974. On 13 August 1974, Congress passed the Proxmire
Resolution which denied the $100,000,000 in advance payments
that Grumman required but did authorize a $25,000,000 advance
payment. On 3 October 1974, Grumman announced agreements
with Bank Melli Iran and a consortium of U. S. banks that
would provide $200,000,000 financing over the next four years.
This arrangement solved Grumman ' s credit difficulties and per-
mitted the continued production of F-14 aircraft.
Although it is not readily evident in the problem context,
feelings from the F-14 Project Office were that Grumman had
control throughout this entire evolution and seemed secure in
the knowledge that the government would provide relief. The
U. S. Government was the instigator and prime agent in the fi-
nancing arrangements that ultimately solved Grumman ' s problem.
Other normal financial problems also occurred during the
F-14 Acquisition Cycle such as overruns in program unit cost
and total program cost< but the problem just discussed was con-
sidered a major management problem in the F-14 acquisition
cycle and was thought to be responsible for the overruns in-
curred. Official statements attribute cost increases to the
increased capabilities demanded as a replacement system. [Note:
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According to Joe Garvin, Jr., Grumman Aerospace President
and Chairman of the Board, 4 0% of the company's aerospace
19business is currently represented by the F-14 . ]
In the F-15 program, two major events contributed to cost
growth which resulted in the Air Force having to decrease its
F-15 production rate from nine per month to twelve per month
to remain within Congressional appropriations. This revision
put about 200 airplanes into the 1980-1982 period instead of
virtually completing the production run by 197 9. The first
problem area is very sensitive and from conversations with the
F-15 Systems Program Office they feel they suffered undue
criticism resulting from a situation out of their control. The
Navy and the Air Force were involved in a joint aircraft engine
development effort with Pratt and Whitney. Pratt and Whitney
was developing the F100/F401 engine program for the Grumman
F-14 and the McDonnell Douglas F-15. The Navy felt that the
engine was inadequate for its operational needs and pulled out
of the concurrent development and individually contracted for
another engine. The Air Force System Program Director had to
choose between schedule slippage as a new engine contract was
arranged or maintaining the present engine production which
would be significantly more expensive now that incurred costs
would not be divided between the two services. The decision
19Brown, Michael , "Tomcat Joins the Fleet: F-14 Fully
Operational," Interavia, December 1974.
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was made to continue present engine development and this re-
sulted in a $500,000,000 cost increase. The Systems Program
Officer had to make a tradeoff decision and the Air Force
feels the correct decision was made. Additional schedule
slippage as a result of a new engine development program would
have led to more increased cost growth as the Acquisition Cycle
pushed forward in time.
The other major event that contributed to the $2.4 billion
total program cost growth as of the end of FY7 6 was one that
the Air Force feels it had no control over. This was the period
between 1970-1974 when excessively high unforecasted inflation
was at work in the American economy. The Systems Program Of-
fice was able to predict the results of this bottled-up energy
of four years of excessive inflation in December of 1974, when
20it attached overrun dollar figures to the program. The
Systems Program Office also feels that McDonnell Douglas was
not realistic in their forecast figures during this inflation-
ary period and this also added to the problem. Presently the
Air Force is trying to estimate the cost growth that inevit-
ably will result from reduced production rate and a delayed
completion on the production contract.
In reviewing these major problem areas in the F-14 and F-15
programs, it is the author's contention that the solutions to
20 Gregory, William H., "Inflation Boosts F-15 Program Cost,"
Aviation Week and Space Technology, 2 August 1976.
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the problems were inevitable and controlled by environmental
events. This is not an insinuation of poor management prac-
tices but perhaps a realistic look at how little control a
Program Manager may have over his own program. He can be
literally overwhelmed by major economic forces beyond his
control, and perhaps at times beyond anyone's control.
VI. SUMMARY
This thesis has been an attempt to point out the differ-
ences in Aircraft Acquisition Management between the Air
Force "ard the Navy by examining and comparing their manage-
ment practices and techniques.
In summary, the ultimate goal in both services' Aircraft
Acquisition Programs is almost identical. The resources,
expertise and tools available for utilization in the Acquisi-
tion Process are also very similar but it is service application
that brings about the differences.
Detailed difference discussion comprised the body of this
thesis. In summarizing, however, the author would like to
back away from detailed description and attempt to generalize
on two points perceived as very important in the differences
in Aircraft Acquisition Management and propose that perhaps
these are the driving force for all the differences found.
These two points were neither substantiated nor denied by the
services and are just a hypothesis on the author's part that
perhaps can never be tested.
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The first point deals with strategy: the Navy's strategy
in an Aircraft Acquisition revolves around flexibility and
reactivity. It perceives the aircraft acquisition world as being
very volatile and the key to success lies in its ability to re-
act quickly and efficiently to any event or circumstance and to
be flexible enough to channel efforts up whatever avenue dic-
tates success. The Air Force strategy in an Aircraft Acquisi-
tion revolves around removing as much of the uncertainty as
possible. This is accomplished through extensive standardiza-
tion and detailed procedures. The Air Force seems to believe
that the key to success in an aircraft acquisition is to re-
move as ma^y variables as possible thus somewhat stabilizing
the environment.
The second point revolves around control as a result of
diversification. It seems readily apparent that the Commander,
Naval Air Systems Command exercises much more control over the
acquEition process than does the Commander, Aeronautical Systems
Division even though both occupy the same relative position in
the command chain. The author feels that this is a result of
the acquisition diversification in the Navy. The Chief of
Naval Material is involved in acquiring weapon systems for
three major and totally different operating environments -
air, surface and subsurface. He therefore has to rely on the
System Commands for control and expertise in Weapon System
Acquisitions for their individual environment. The Commander,
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Air Force Systems Command, counterpart to the Chief of
Naval Material, finds almost all of his weapon system ac-
quisitions related to the air operating environment. His
knowledge and expertise is therefore centered and he can
exercise more control over the Acquisition Process because
of this operating environment focusing effect. Much of the
responsibility and control exercised by Commander Naval Air
Systems Command is retained by the next echelon level in the
Air Force, the Air Force Systems Command.
It is felt that the difference between the services on these
two major points provide a cause and effect relationship to the
more detailed differences found in the Aircraft Acquisition
Man§gement practices and techniques described.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The differences in Aircraft Acquisition Management practices
between the Air Force and the Navy are minimal when compared to
the similarities. These differences essentially do not evolve
from techniques as much as from applications of techniques.
The author feels that this is a reflection of the attitude of
control and routinization found in Air Force Aircraft Acquisi-
tion versus the act and react mode of operations found in the
Navy's Aircraft Acquisition Management.
To conclude this thesis the author would like to make two
points and from these points construct some recommendations
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that could aid the Aircraft Acquisition Process in both
services.
The first point is that the Aircraft Acquisition Management
field is understaffed in the area of personnel with business
and financial management expertise. The Acquisition Managers
venture into big business dealings in Aircraft procurement,
sometime lacking the business expertise necessary to cope
with the competitive environment they should be attempting
to control. Expertise in technical fields and in defining
operational needs is adequate, but the deficiency in business and
financial management capabilities that is sometimes evident
could be extremely detrimental to the acquisition program. The
need for improvement in this area is readily recognized and ef-
forts are currently underway to narrow this deficiency gap, but
the process will take time and immediate relief is not fore-
seeable nor feasible.
To be realistic, the aerospace contractor is not a partner
in a business venture and by virtue of the nature of his conduct
the Acquisition Manager should be maintaining an arms-length
relationship. In conducting business with the Department of
Defense the contractor marshalls years of educational and prac-
tical business and financial management experience. Unfortu-
nately at times the Department of Defense is forced to conduct
its part of the acquisition with relatively inexperienced per-
sonnel, inadequately trained with a duty tour rotation
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that is contrary to continuity and involvement. Many times
the Acquisition Manager has to elicit the help of the con-
tractor in order to sell the Aircraft program effectively to
higher levels and insure correct and proper business procedures
are adhered to. As was mentioned before, in theory, however,
the Acquisition Manager should be maintaining an arm's length
buyer-seller relationship with the contractor. At times the
DoD Acquisition Manager is forced to supplement his business
and financial management expertise by contracted consulting
firms. It would be better to employ the resources on inter-
nal expertise.
Both services have constructed advanced education curri-
cula in Acquisition Management and created a subspecialty in
acquisition that can be attained through education or practical
experience. Both services are correcting the image of sub-
performers being detailed to the Acquisition Management field.
New screening processes and recent promotion selections are indi-
cative of the high caliber of personnel the services feel are ne-
cessary to maintain quality in Acquisitions Management.
Why not go a step further, however? It is apparent that
Systems Acquisition is big business. In Fiscal Year 1977, 9.5
billion dollars will be budgeted for Aircraft procurement. The
total System Acquisition budget for the Department of Defense
will be well over three times this amount. With the large
amounts of money involved and the emphasis placed on proper
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resource allocation and cost control, why ^ not create an
Acquisition Management Corps similar to the Supply Corps
or the Civil Engineer Corps? For this Acquisition Corps
create a set career ladder where one can advance up the
ranks in this specialty and be competitive with officers in
other specialties for promotional opportunities! Recruit
into this Corps individuals with business and financial
management and technical backgrounds and then supplement
this with advanced education in these specialties. This pre-
vents rotation from removing an individual from the acquisi-
tion environment for a three-year tour in an operational
status and then returning him to have to refresh and catch
up as in the present projected method. Operational expertise
could be provided by representatives in the Acquisition Pro-
grams and the author feels it is not essential for an Air-
craft Acquisition Manager to be an operator as long as the
expertise is available through representatives and the needs
are incorporated.
Once this corps has been created, staff an Acquisition
Program with these individuals and let them remain with the
Program for its entire duration. If the key decisions are to
be made by military managers the continuity, familiarity and
involvement this approach provides is essential. As an indi-
vidual advances up the career ladder he can move up the chain
in his Aircraft Acquisition Program to assume greater
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responsibility, with the gaps at the bottom of the hierarchy-
being filled by new personnel. When an Aircraft Acquisition
is complete, these individuals can then staff another Acquisi-
tion Program. This Acquisition Corps concept can be equally
applied to a Program or Matrix organizational structure. It
is felt that this is a feasible solution to a critical problem
and would provide great benefits to the Aircraft Acquisition
Process in the Navy and the Air Force or all DoD agencies
procuring aircraft or any system for that matter.
The second point is that increased intraservice cooperation
and information flow would prove extremely beneficial to both
services. Due to the heavy tasking in Aircraft Acquisition/
proper information flow between the services seems to receive
a very low priority. The F-14 and F-15 were very similar
procurements, yet the two Program Officers were so deeply in-
volved in their own programs with extremely heavy tasking that
minimal information exchange occurred.
At this point it would seem appropriate to digress a mo-
ment and reflect on a point that has been hotly contended for
years and on which the author has formed some opinionated views
based on the research done, the point being co-procurement of
one aircraft type by the Navy and the Air Force. The question
is continually raised, especially by those committees in Con-
gress concerned with funding aircraft acquisition programs, as
to why the services can't procure one aircraft that would fit
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both their needs. The baseline argument that is usually
presented is that differences in operational environments
necessitate different types of aircraft with different capa-
bilities. This is in fact a partial justification, but the
author feels that intraservice rivalry for funding and the
autonomous existence that has resulted is also a key element
in this individualistic approach to aircraft procurement. The
author feels that with proper coordination and planning, perhaps
one aircraft could be procured by both services with specific
modifications utilized to negate the differences in operating
environment and mission. This co-procurement concept would
hold true only when dealing with fighter and attack aircraft as
this is where similarity in aircraft type is feasible. The F-4
and A-7 are good examples of this dual utilization of one air-
craft type. The F-4 was probably the most versatile and suc-
cessful aircraft deployed to date by either the Navy or the Air
Force and required only minor modifications to adapt it to each
service's specific needs. As the author traced the development
of the F-14 and F-15, the opinion grew that one aircraft pro-
curement might have satisfied the needs of both services. Com-
bined RDT&E efforts, pooling o£ resources and expertise, one
central program supported by both services in the PPBS cycle
and in the political battle would reap enormous benefits in cost
savings and also in helping to alleviate Congressional criticism
of service aircraft acquisition. As one looks to the futue
in attack and fighter aircraft, especially considering the
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trend to VSTOL aircraft, the co-procurement philosophy be-
comes more feasible and perhaps presents a realistic solution
to cost savings problems and the allocation of scarce resources
in aircraft acquisition.
Even if the co-procurement policy never emerges, there is
a real need to enhance the information flow between the two
services in tie aircraft acquisition world. Presently this
information flow is minimal and receives low priority. The
author feels a more active exchange of information could be
extremely beneficial.
Why not set up a combined information system coordinated
by a common office that provides equal accessibility by either
service? This information system should be structured to pro-
vide not only historical information but current data to pro-
vide the services with all available information to facilitate
their management of aircraft acquisition. In addition, set up
periodic conferences between key aircraft acquisition personnel
individuals to provide more interface between the services and
interchanges of ideas.
The scarcity of resources and concurrent intense scrutini-
zation of programs for funding is a reality that has to be ac-
cepted and one the Department of Defense will have to live with
indefinitely. By its very nature this creates competition
between service sisters for individual program funding. If
something is not done, this competition and resulting
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isolationistic attitude can not help but intensify with the
results being ultimately detrimental. Increased cooperation,
coordination and interchange is the initial step to rectify
this possibility and will benefit the aircraft acquisition
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F-14/ Phoenix Project Management Office
Personnel Breakdown
Number Rank Management Secretarial Engineering
1 RADM 1
1 CAPTAIN 1
3 CDRS 1 2
1 LCDR 1
2 LT 1 1
4 GS-14 1 3
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